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Abstract 
∎ The presidential transition in Uzbekistan represents a novel development 
in the post-Soviet space. Regime insider Shavkat Mirziyoyev has succeeded 
in initiating change without provoking destabilisation. His reform pro-
gramme aims to liberalise the economy and society while leaving the politi-
cal system largely untouched. 
∎ Implementation is centrally controlled and managed, in line with the 
country’s long history of state planning. Uzbeks accept painful adjust-
ments in the expectation of a rising standard of living. And the economic 
reforms are rapidly creating incontrovertible facts on the ground. 
∎ Uzbekistan has also made significant moves towards political liberalisa-
tion, but remains an authoritarian state whose institutional framework 
and presidential system are not up for discussion. Rather than democrati-
sation, the outcome of the transformation is more likely to be “enlightened 
authoritarianism” backed by an alliance of old and new elites. 
∎ Nevertheless, there are good reasons for Germany and Europe to support 
the reforms. Priority should be placed on the areas most relevant for 
fostering an open society: promoting political competition, encouraging 
open debate, fostering independent public engagement and enabling 
genuine participation. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Uzbekistan’s Transformation: 
Strategies and Perspectives 
Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Islom 
Karimov in December 2016 Uzbekistan has presented 
the image of a state under renewal. Initial doubts that 
the new leader would really pursue a course out of 
post-Soviet stagnation have been swept away. After 
two decades of economic and political isolation under 
Karimov, Mirziyoyev immediately launched reforms 
designed to prepare the ground for economic liber-
alisation, attract outside investment to develop un-
tapped economic potential, and bring Uzbekistan up 
to the level of developed countries. Transformation 
to a market economy, modernisation of the adminis-
tration and liberalisation of society are the overarch-
ing goals of the state development programme. Presi-
dent Mirziyoyev, who presents himself as the reformer 
personified, tirelessly underlines the strategic im-
portance of the reforms and rallies support for the 
project. 
In every respect, the transition in Uzbekistan repre-
sents a novelty in the post-Soviet space: The scenario 
of a peaceful succession by a regime insider promis-
ing fundamental political change had been regarded 
as extremely unlikely. Power struggles within the elites 
and public unrest had been regarded as more plau-
sible (as in the “colour revolutions” in Georgia 2003, 
Kyrgyzstan 2005, and the Ukrainian “Euromaidan” 
of 2013), or a new leader continuing the old political 
course (Azerbaijan 2003, Turkmenistan 2006 and 
Kazakhstan 2019). 
This raises the question of the objectives and 
durability of the Uzbek transition. The reform pro-
gramme laid out in the Development Strategy for 2017 
to 2021 is so comprehensive and ambitious that im-
plementation would appear to require a mobilisation 
of all relevant actors. Many of the proposed policy 
measures are in fact designed to anchor the reform 
concept within the elites and across society, and to 
ensure that the changes are irreversible. Three stra-
tegically relevant areas can be identified: reorganising 
the security apparatus, modernising cadres and gov-
ernance, and mobilising society. Foreign policy also 
plays a decisive role for the success of the reform 
project. 
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There were several candidates to succeed Karimov, 
whose policies had greatly benefitted large sections of 
the elites. It was by no means certain that they would 
support the new course set by his successor. It was 
therefore central for Mirziyoyev to create a loyal inner 
circle and to secure his position through institutional 
measures and strategic appointments. While public 
resistance to the new president was not expected, un-
conditional support for his reform agenda was not 
either. Large sections of society had found an accom-
modation with Karimov’s “Uzbek development 
model” – not necessarily to their disadvantage. The 
economic and monetary reforms rapidly set in motion 
by Mirziyoyev demand painful adjustments from 
many Uzbeks. In return the government promises 
greater prosperity through economic development, 
more accountability and better access to public 
services. Society is also expected to participate actively 
in the national renewal. Under the new official doc-
trine the state is expected to serve the people – and 
in return the nation is expected to serve the great 
reform project, whose implementation is as always 
centrally controlled and managed. 
Mirziyoyev’s new social contract is a tall order for 
a society unaccustomed to being asked its opinion, a 
nation that had learned that political engagement 
was dangerous. Yet the state reform policy has been 
a success. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
the insistence of the calls for reform create pressure 
to show results and generate visible change from 
which many parties benefit. This makes the reform 
project credible. Secondly, the pace of implementation 
carries along those who are wary of change but find 
themselves without a choice, so there is apparently no 
alternative to the reform project. Thirdly, the project’s 
grand narrative is not new. Mirziyoyev’s predecessor 
and the Soviet-era leaders before him also propagated 
modernisation through radical change and mobili-
sation of all available resources as the road to a better 
future. The concept driving the reforms is thus 
familiar. 
The head of state’s drive for reforms and national 
reinvention – framed by prominent and lavishly 
staged historical commemorations and identity-
affirming presentations – also generates internation-
al confidence in Uzbekistan. This is directly reflected 
in growing commitments of foreign investment and 
loans, whose significance for the implementation of 
the reforms cannot be overstated. The Uzbek Develop-
ment Strategy itself and its commitment to liberal 
values are not least responses to the expectations of 
international donors, who value sustainability and tie 
their support to good governance. Important signals 
on human rights demonstrate that the Uzbek leader-
ship has taken on board central aspects of the Western 
model. But there is also strong resistance. Uzbekistan 
remains an authoritarian state with a presidential 
system, whose institutional base is not up for discus-
sion. Authoritarian practices and attitudes continue 
to determine the behaviour of relevant actors. Espe-
cially where conflicts and crises occur, it is apparent 
that the past – which the new leadership is so keen 
to bury – is far from dead. 
For Germany and Europe, the “simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous” (Ernst Bloch) that characterises 
the Uzbek reform moment offers multiple openings 
for cooperation. In principle this applies to all areas 
of the reform agenda. But the most difficult and deli-
cate – and also most pressing – aspect relates to the 
authoritarian complex: the institutions, attitudes and 
behaviours that continue to enable abuses of power. 
Encouraging reflection on these issues should there-
fore form a consistent theme running through all 
cooperation. 
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An Insider Takes the Reins 
Replacing a dictator is always a fraught affair. Removal 
by popular vote is not an option, so unless they die 
in office authoritarian rulers tend to be driven from 
power, whether by members of their own inner circle 
or by mass protests. Unrest is almost always associated 
with violence, while a resignation forced by regime 
insiders need not necessarily require a coup; internal 
compromise is also a plausible route. What both 
variants share in common is that they rarely lead to 
any substantive change in policy. Authoritarian rule 
is merely renewed.1 
In the case of Uzbekistan observers had long 
assumed that President Karimov’s dictatorship would 
inevitably end in violence – or a new dictatorship.2 
Uzbekistan’s political stability was regarded as a prod-
uct of repression by the security organs, in a dissatis-
fied and mobilisable society. The elites were thought 
to be riven by bitter power struggles between strategic 
groups, including the widely feared intelligence ser-
vice. Whoever won the internal struggle to succeed 
Karimov would definitely be the product of a com-
promise that secured the country’s repressive, 
authoritarian course. 
A political insider did indeed succeed to the presi-
dency in December 2016. But Shavkat Mirziyoyev 
immediately subverted expectations in several impor-
tant respects. The transition was smooth: any con-
flicts within the elites remained discreetly veiled and 
 
1 Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, “How Autocra-
cies Fall”, Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2014): 35–47 (42). 
2 Andrew Stroehlein, “Why Uzbekistan Matters”, CNN, 
18 October 2011, https://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/ 
2011/10/18/why-uzbekistan-matters/; Johannes Dell, “Lifeless 
Uzbek Election Hides Power Struggle”, BBC, 27 March 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31798756; Abdujalil 
Abdurasulov, “Intrigue and Power Games as Uzbek Leader 
Ails”, BBC, 1 September 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-asia-37241645 (all accessed 30 June 2020). 
the new head of state immediately set about mobilis-
ing the population for a set of policies designed to 
liberalise the economy and society and put an end 
to repression. This represents such a stark contrast to 
his predecessor that doubts over the genuineness of 
Mirziyoyev’s reforms certainly appeared justified.3 It 
quickly became apparent, however, that his commit-
ment was more than mere lip service; the new head 
of state appeared to be serious about change. 
One reason why Mirziyoyev can so credibly em-
body the reformer might be that his own political 
career began in an earlier period of transition. It was 
in 1990, when the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
already under way, that he moved from academia to 
politics. When he was elected to the Supreme Soviet 
of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in Febru-
ary 1990 he was thirty-three years old, a doctor of 
engineering and vice-rector at the Tashkent Institute 
of Irrigation and Melioration. Shortly thereafter the 
Soviet elected Islom Karimov, who had been First 
Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party since 1989, 
to the newly created position of President of the 
Uzbek SSR.4 Karimov declared Uzbekistan independ-
ent immediately after the August 1991 coup against 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and was elected president in 
December 1991. 
From here on Mirziyoyev’s career was tied to the 
rule of Karimov, who was granted sweeping powers 
by the new constitution adopted in December 1992.5 
 
3 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “After Karimov: How Does the 
Transition of Power Look in Uzbekistan?” BBC, 13 October 
2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37608869 
(accessed 30 June 2020). 
4 Supreme Soviet of the Usbek SSR introduced this new 
position in March 1990; Nikolaj A. Borisov, Prezidenstvo na 
postsovetskom prostranstve: protsessy genezisa i transformatsiy 
[The office of president in the post-Soviet space: Processes 
of genesis and transformation] (Moscow, 2018), 32 ff. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, http://www.ksu.uz/ 
en/page/index/id/7 (accessed 30 June 2020). 
The Reformer and 
His Programme 
The Reformer and His Programme 
SWP Berlin 
Uzbekistan’s Transformation 
September 2020 
8 
In 1992 Mirziyoyev was appointed to the local admin-
istration in Tashkent, where he served in executive 
functions until 1996. His responsibilities expanded 
considerably in 1996 when he was appointed as gov-
ernor of Jizzakh region (until 2001) and later Samar-
kand region (2001 to 2003). In December 2003 he was 
nominated as prime minister by President Karimov 
and confirmed by parliament. He was reappointed 
three times in succession, most recently in 2015. 
Mirziyoyev’s unusually long tenure as head of govern-
ment, with special responsibility for agriculture and 
regional development,6 may be regarded as an indi-
cation that he had secured a solid foothold in Kari-
mov’s inner circle, numbering among his closest con-
fidants. Anecdotal reports back up this assertion.7 
A new start emerging from the 
shadows of the past. 
After Karimov’s death, which was officially an-
nounced in early September 2016, the experienced 
and well connected Mirziyoyev was quickly seen 
as one of the most likely successors.8 Speculation 
became fact on 8 September when the chairman of 
the senate, Nigmatilla Yuldashev (who, under Article 
96 of the constitution, should actually have assumed 
the president’s responsibilities until an election could 
be held), proposed the more experienced Mirziyoyev 
as interim president. Both chambers of parliament 
followed his recommendation, citing the need to pre-
serve stability and public order.9 This indicates how 
concerned the relevant strategic groups were to en-
sure a smooth transition, which is never a certainty 
even in a consolidated autocracy. 
The outcome of the presidential election on 4 De-
cember 2016 was predictable. Mirziyoyev received 
 
6 President Mirziyoyev’s official biography can be found 
on the website of the Uzbek embassies: https://www.uzbek 
embassy.org/e/president/ (accessed 30 June 2020). 
7 For example a diplomatic cable from the US embassy in 
Tashkent dated August 2008: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ 
cables/08TASHKENT977_a.html (accessed 30 June 2020). 
8 Dell, “Lifeless Uzbek Election Hides Power Struggle” 
(see note 2); Abdurasulov, “Intrigue and Power Games” 
(see note 2). 
9 “Informatsionnoe soobshzhenie o sovmestnom zasedanii 
Zakonodatel’noy palaty i senata Olij Mazhlisa Respubliki 
Uzbekistan” [Information about a joint session of the Legis-
lative Chamber and the Senate of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan], 8 September 2016, https://www.gov. 
uz/ru/news/view/7246 (accessed 30 June 2020). 
88.6 percent to defeat three other candidates. Although 
the election was accompanied by numerous irregular-
ities,10 these are unlikely to have significantly swayed 
the outcome. Under Uzbek electoral law each candi-
date had been nominated by one of the four political 
parties represented in parliament at the time – whose 
programmes were almost identical. The election cam-
paign was correspondingly tame, but did offer Mirzi-
yoyev broad scope to exploit the administrative 
resources available to him as interim president,11 and 
to publicise his programme. 
The latter essentially linked two apparently mutu-
ally exclusive concepts: a commitment to preserve 
Karimov’s political legacy and determination to pro-
ceed with urgently needed reforms. The demonstra-
tive promise of continuity, which was reiterated in 
all the new leader’s early speeches,12 was directed 
towards all those who had made themselves very com-
fortable under Karimov and were less than enthusias-
tic about the prospect of change. When Mirziyoyev 
underlined that his reform policies would adhere to 
his predecessor’s “Uzbek development model” he was 
letting the doubters know that they could trust him 
as Karimov’s political heir. 
Soon after taking office, Mirziyoyev underlined this 
message in a symbolic act of homage to his nation’s 
political culture: the construction of a mausoleum on 
Karimov’s grave in the grounds of a historic mosque 
in his native city of Samarkand. Since it opened in 
January 2018 the memorial has become a popular 
place of pilgrimage, complete with rituals characteris-
tic of holy sites.13 The sacralisation of power is firmly 
 
10 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe/ 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ 
ODHIR), Republic of Uzbekistan, Early Presidential Election 4 Decem-
ber 2016, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 
(Warsaw, 21 March 2017), https://www.osce.org/office-for-
democratic-institutions-and-human-rights/elections/uzbekistan/ 
306451?download=true (accessed 30 June 2020). 
11 Ibid., 1 f. 
12 For example during the extended meeting of the cabinet 
on 15 January 2017: Kriticheskiy analiz, zhestkaya disciplina I per-
sonal’naya otvetstvennost’ dolzhny stat’ povsednevnoy normoy v deya-
tel’nosti kazhdogo rukovoditelya [Critical analysis, strict disci-
pline and personal responsibility must become the everyday 
norm for every leader], https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/187 
(accessed 30 June 2020). 
13 A short film published by the Islom Karimov Founda-
tion on 8 May 2019 offers striking insights: https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=dVtCwO6yc3E (accessed 30 June 
2020). 
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established in the political cultures of Central Asia. 
Mirziyoyev was satisfying a widespread expectation 
when he granted his predecessor a prominent place 
in Uzbekistan’s sacral geography – and at the same 
time symbolically underlining his own claim to be 
the legitimate successor. 
The construction of the mausoleum in Samarkand 
and other tributes to Islom Karimov and his era – the 
ceremonial inauguration of monuments in Samar-
kand and Tashkent and the conversion of his former 
residence into a museum – are also politically sig-
nificant because these forms of musealisation grant 
Karimov a prominent and unchallengeable place 
in the nation’s collective memory. Integrating the 
founder into the canon of greats of Uzbek history and 
thus making him a part of an established historical 
semantics neutralises the case for historical reapprais-
al.14 The message is: One can – and should – now 
look to the future. 
Even before taking office, Mirziyoyev had made 
it clear that change was coming. It was this second, 
much more challenging element of his programmatic 
oxymoron that raised expectations, within Uzbekistan 
and even more so abroad. But in order to understand 
Mirziyoyev’s reform agenda, the strategies he has pur-
sued to implement it, and the overall direction of the 
transformation process, we must first review the era 
of his predecessor Karimov. 
Uzbekistan under Karimov 
Karimov’s Uzbekistan was a state with remarkable 
internal stability and a high degree of economic 
autarchy, and was regarded as one of the world’s 
most repressive.15 Unlike neighbours such as Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan shunned economic liberalisation 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and pre-
served core characteristics of the centrally planned 
economy. Small businesses and retail were rapidly 
privatised but the strategic sectors – agriculture, 
 
14 For details: Andrew F. March, “The Use and Abuse of 
History: ‘National Ideology’ as Transcendental Object in Islam 
Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence’”, Central Asian 
Survey 21, no. 4 (2002): 371–84 (374 ff.). 
15 The latest Freedom House reports still categorise Uzbeki-
stan as “consolidated authoritarian”; see Freedom in the World 
2018: Uzbekistan, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2cb8386. 
html und Freedom in the World 2019: Uzbekistan, https://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1151971/download (both accessed 
30 June 2020). 
fossil fuels, energy, transport and services, and the 
enterprises involved in them – remained subject to 
state planning and control, as did foreign trade and 
banking.16 
This initial decision was indicated by the economic 
structure inherited from the Soviet era, in which three 
factors were of fundamental importance: firstly the 
country’s constellation of resources and specialisation 
in agriculture, especially cotton-growing (which had 
accounted for more than 60 percent of the Soviet 
Union’s production). Another significant resource is 
gold, of which Uzbekistan possesses the world’s sixth-
largest reserves. With cotton and gold, secondly, 
Uzbekistan possesses resources that are easy to export 
and generate large revenues. And thirdly, light indus-
try orientated largely on the needs of agriculture 
allowed domestic production of basic consumer goods 
that had hitherto been imported. Local production of 
wheat (which accounted for about 40 percent of im-
ports in 1989) and oil products was also stepped up. 
Achieving self-sufficiency in strategic economic 
sectors and avoiding social unrest were also the prin-
cipal objectives of state economic policy. Both miti-
gated against radical reforms that could have risked 
social unrest – especially in view of the low standard 
of living of the rural population, which made up 40 
percent of the total in 1989.17 A fundamental eco-
nomic reorientation would also have endangered the 
established system of political relationships, which 
was based on the state-controlled production of cash 
crops (cotton and later cereals) and the division of the 
resulting revenues (rents) between the involved stra-
tegic groups.18 The central apparatus, the associated 
bureaucracies, and the regional agriculture-based 
elites enjoyed de facto control over access to the cen-
tral production factors (land, labour, capital) and all 
had multiple possibilities to skim rents for particular 
ends and to build their own influence networks.19 
Implementing the state development objectives thus 
depended on ensuring the flow of resource revenues 
 
16 Kobil Ruziev, Dipak Ghosh and Sheila C. Dow, “The Uz-
bek Puzzle Revisited: An Analysis of Economic Performance 
in Uzbekistan since 1991”, Central Asia Survey 26, no. 1 (2007): 
7–30 (12). 
17 Ibid., 8–11. 
18 Lawrence P. Markowitz, “Rural Economies and Leader-
ship Change in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey 35, no. 4 
(2016): 514–30. 
19 Idem., “Beyond Kompromat: Coercion, Corruption, and 
Deterred Defection in Uzbekistan”, Comparative Politics, (Octo-
ber 2017): 103–21 (112 f.). 
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to the centre and containing the power of the regional 
elites, which also included private-sector entrepre-
neurs. 
To achieve this, the regime increasingly employed 
the institutions of the security apparatus and from 
1997 successively expanded the powers of the law 
enforcement authorities – tax inspection as well as 
intelligence service and police – to keep tabs on key 
local actors. However, integrating the organs of 
repression into the structures they were supposed to 
keep under surveillance did not lead to more efficient 
action against corruption; instead it enabled the secu-
rity services to participate in illegal rent skimming 
using means such as blackmail, threats and physical 
violence, in conjunction with local administrative 
actors.20 The resulting entanglement of security insti-
tutions and resource extraction made the regime 
increasingly dependent on the former. 
This coalesced the elites, most of whose leading 
figures belonged to President Karimov’s inner circle 
and maintained patronage networks extending down 
to the local level.21 At the same time, the powerful 
security apparatus functioned as an effective deter-
rent to dissent. Opposition tended to come from the 
private business sector, whose property was protected 
neither by institutional guarantees nor informal 
mechanisms, thus making them especially vulnerable 
to overreach by the state’s organs of repression.22 
Although demands for a liberalisation of trade and 
commerce were frequently voiced, they fell on deaf 
ears because they contradicted the interests of the 
leading circles.23 
That said, the stability of Karimov’s system was not 
based exclusively on coercion and repression. Since 
the late 1990s, largely unnoticed by the outside world, 
a (predominantly urban) middle class had emerged 
and accommodated itself to the circumstances. This 
milieu was socially heterogeneous, comprising a 
broad spectrum of public employees above all in the 
health and education sectors and the administra-
tion.24 That was no coincidence: Since the end of the 
 
20 Ibid., 111 f. 
21 Ibid., 114–116. 
22 Barbara Junisbai, “Improbable But Potentially Pivotal 
Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contes-
tation in the Post-Soviet Autocracies”, Perspectives on Politics 
10, no. 4 (December 2012): 891–916 (901). 
23 Ibid., 905. 
24 Tommaso Trevisani, “The Reshaping of Cities and Citi-
zens in Uzbekistan: The Case of Namangan’s ‘New Uzbeks’”, 
in Ethnographies of the State in Central Asia: Performing Politics, 
1990s the public sector had profited from rising invest-
ment, in association with the expansion of manu-
facturing in the second decade of independence and 
enabled by high global prices for cotton, gold and 
natural gas.25 
These “new Uzbeks” (yangi davr odam), as state 
propaganda referred to these ideal citizens, were the 
product of a modernisation programme ideologically 
grounded in a narrative of de-Sovietization and 
national consolidation,26 which had effected a deep 
transformation also affecting the urban landscape. 
The changes signified by widened roads, new multi-
storey buildings, shopping centres, restaurants, and 
expanded and covered bazaars, also opened up new 
possibilities of employment and consumption and 
were perceived by the majority as representing pro-
gress.27 Official statistics backed up the perception 
with figures indicating steady economic growth aver-
aging 8 percent and implying a continuous rise in 
the standard of living.28 
In reality, however, life became harder for many 
Uzbeks after the end of the Soviet Union. Large sec-
tions of the population were economically squeezed 
and often forced to seek alternative and/or additional 
sources of income.29 Seasonal labour migration to 
Russia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere grew after the dis-
solution and restructuring of the agricultural collec-
 
ed. Madeleine Reeves, Johan Rasanayagam and Judith Beyer 
(Bloomington, 2014), 243–60. 
25 World Bank, Uzbekistan: On the Path to High-Middle-Income 
Status by 2030, 13 April 2016, https://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/results/2016/04/13/uzbekistan-on-the-path-to-high-middle-
income-status-by-2050.print (accessed 1 July 2020); Mamuka 
Tsereteli, “The Economic Modernization of Uzbekistan”, 
in Uzbekistan’s New Face, ed. S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. 
Cornell (London, 2018), 82–114 (85 f.). 
26 Sergej Abashin, “Entsowjetisierung und Erinnerungs-
politik in Zentralasien”, Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismus-
forschung, (2014): 125–38; March, “The Use and Abuse of 
History” (see note 14). 
27 Trevisani, “The Reshaping of Cities and Citizens” 
(see note 24), 249 f. 
28 Ruziev et al., “The Uzbek Puzzle” (see note 16), 15 f.; 
see also Human Development Report: Inequalities in Human Devel-
opment in the 21st Century: Briefing Note for Countries on the 2019 
Human Development Report: Uzbekistan, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ 
all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/UZB.pdf (accessed 1 July 
2020). 
29 Trevisani, “The Reshaping of Cities and Citizens” 
(see note 24), 247 f. 
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tives (shirkat) in 2000, and accelerated after 2004.30 
The proportion of GDP contributed by small-scale 
private enterprises rose from more or less zero to 45 
percent by 1997, but largely plateaued at that level.31 
From 2002 the regime successively imposed new 
tariffs on imported goods and required bazaaris to 
apply for licences, in order to suppress the growing 
demand for foreign currency and stem the capital 
flight associated with cross-border trade. The resulting 
impediments to trade weighed on living conditions 
for those working in the semi-informal sector and 
fuelled dissatisfaction with state policies. This burst 
into the open in May 2005 with large-scale protests 
in Andijan.32 
The bloody suppression of those protests by police 
and military forces and the refusal of the Uzbek 
leadership to permit an independent international 
investigation led to a diplomatic rift with the United 
States and Europe. Against the background of a wave 
of “colour revolutions”, which saw the president 
of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan toppled in March 2005, 
Western criticisms of the Andijan massacre led 
Uzbekistan to tighten internal repression and initiate 
a long period of self-isolation.33 Nevertheless it did 
remain an important partner for the United States 
and Europe on account of its role in NATO’s supply 
lines for its forces stationed in Afghanistan.34 
 
30 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), Gender, Agriculture and Rural Development in 
Uzbekistan (Budapest, 2019), 15 f., http://www.fao.org/3/ 
ca4628en/ca4628en.pdf; Evgeniy Abdullaev, Labour Migration 
in the Republic of Uzbekistan: Social, Legal and Gender Aspects 
(Tashkent, 2008), http://www.gender.cawater-info.net/ 
publications/pdf/labour-migration-uzbekistan-en.pdf (both 
accessed 1 July 2020). 
31 Ruziev, “The Uzbek Puzzle” (see note 16), 25; Bertels-
mann Transformation Index (BTI), Uzbekistan Country Report 
2018, 21, https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/ 
reports/country_report_2018_UZB.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020). 
32 Ruziev, “The Uzbek Puzzle” (see note 16), 25 f.; Inter-
national Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia 
Briefing 38 (Bishkek and Brussels, 25 May 2005), 8 f., 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b38-uzbekistan-the-
andijon-uprising.pdf (accessed 1 July 2020). 
33 Martha Brill Olcott, “Uzbekistan: A Decaying Dictator-
ship Withdrawn from the West”, in Worst of the Worst: Dealing 
with Repressive and Rogue Nations, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Wash-
ington, D.C., 2007), 250–68. 
34 Andrea Schmitz, Beyond Afghanistan: The New ISAF Strategy: 
Implications for Central Asia, SWP Comment 10/2010 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2010), https://www. 
The Reform Agenda 
Given the starting situation outlined above, the 
reforms announced by Shavkat Mirziyoyev represent 
a real break with the past. His programme was laid 
out during the 2016 election campaign and published 
in February 2017, as one of his first presidential de-
crees.35 The decree lays out a binding political course:36 
a five-year Development Strategy for 2017–202137 
to “modernise and liberalise all spheres of life”. Five 
areas of reform are identified: 
(I) State and society, 
(II) Rule of law and the judicial system, 
(III) Economic development 
(IV) Social policy and 
(V) Security, foreign policy, nationalities and 
religion policies. 
A hierarchy of commissions is formally responsible 
for implementing the strategy. At their apex is the 
National Commission, under which separate bodies 
are responsible for each of the five areas; their tasks 
and composition are defined in the strategy docu-
ment. The Development Strategy also stipulates that 
a reform priority will be set each year, with a pro-
gramme of its own listing in detail the measures 
required, estimating costs, and naming the expected 
outcomes.38 
 
swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/ 
2010C10_smz_ks.pdf. 
35 On the significance of decrees: OSCE/ODIHR, Preliminary 
Assessment of the Legislative Process in the Republic of Uzbekistan 
(Warsaw, 11 December 2019), 38, https://www.legislation 
line.org/download/id/8517/file/364_11Dec2019_en.pdf 
(accessed 1 July 2020). 
36 Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan: O Strategii Dejstviy po 
dal’neyshemu razvitiyu Respubliki Uzbekistan [Decree of the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Development 
Strategy for Uzbekistan], doc. no. UP-4947, 7 February 2017, 
https://lex.uz/docs/3107042#3108077 (accessed 1 July 2020). 
37 Strategiya Dejstviy po pyati prioritetnym napravleniyam raz-
vitiya Respubliki Uzbekistan v 2017–2021 godach [Development 
Strategy of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2017–2011], 
Appendix 1 to Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan: Strategii 
Dejstviy (see note 36). 
38 The priority for 2017 (“Dialogue with the public and 
the interests of the population”) is already defined in the 
strategy document. The priorities for 2018 (“Supporting 
active entrepreneurs, innovative ideas and technologies”), 
2019 (“Promoting investment and social development”) and 
2020 (“Science, education and the digital economy”) were 
developed successively and published as presidential decrees: 
https://lex.uz/docs/3516841 (Programme 2018), https://lex.uz/ 
The Reformer and His Programme 
SWP Berlin 
Uzbekistan’s Transformation 
September 2020 
12 
Such plans were of course a central aspect of state 
development planning during the Soviet era. And 
under Karimov each year was already dedicated to a 
particular problem, to which the state promised to 
dedicate special attention and sometimes developed 
detailed plans.39 To that extent the Development 
Strategy of 2017 is not an innovation in terms of 
form: it stands explicitly in the context of the Kari-
mov era, whose achievements it underlines. The idea 
is to launch a modern reform policy from that start-
ing point. The implicit message: the old model is no 
longer working. 
Mirziyoyev’s Development Strategy engineers a 
shrewd transition from old to new. The general objec-
tive of development through modernisation is espe-
cially well suited to creating a pre-political consensus 
concerning the legitimacy of state action: it is un-
specific but positively connoted, strongly associated 
with economics and technical innovation, and sup-
posedly unpolitical.40 An economic policy of gradual 
transition to a market economy was already a priority 
under Karimov.41 The same applies to the principle of 
rule of law, where Karimov’s constitutional reforms 
from 2011 expanded the powers of parliament with-
out reducing the power of the executive. There was 
also a significant social policy strand, above all in the 
areas of housing, agricultural development, cultural 
policy and youth policy. 
Two important aspects were fundamentally new 
in Mirziyoyev’s strategy document, however: 
Firstly, the explicit commitment to economic liber-
alism to accelerate growth and make Uzbekistan com-
petitive in its regional and international context (Area 
III in the strategy document). The steps proposed here 
represent a clear break with earlier policies: with-
drawing the state from the economy, encouraging the 
private sector and protecting private ownership. The 
liberalisation of the exchange rate in September 2017, 
the lifting of foreign currency controls, tariff reduc-
tions and a liberalisation of prices signify a paradigm 
 
ru/docs/4168757 (Programme 2019), https://lex.uz/ru/docs/ 
4751567 (Programme 2020) (all accessed 1 July 2020). 
39 One good example is the order on the state programme 
for rural development for 2009, which included a detailed 
catalogue of measures: https://lex.uz/docs/1437234 (accessed 
1 July 2020). 
40 Andrew F. March, “From Leninism to Karimovism: 
Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian Legitimation”, 
Post-Soviet Affairs 19, no. 4 (2003): 307–36 (316). 
41 Islam A. Karimov, Uzbekistan: The Road of Independence 
and Progress (Tashkent, 1992), 16, 36–40. 
shift in economic policy. Liberalisation of the visa 
regime in 2018, the dismantling of trade barriers and 
simplification of the tax system all had a dynamising 
effect on foreign trade and created incentives for both 
the private sector and international donors to operate 
in Uzbekistan.42 
The second aspect relates to the relationship be-
tween state and society, and thus to fundamental 
questions of political order (Area I in the strategy 
document). Here again the intention is to expand the 
reach of liberal principles, as well as strengthening 
the role of parliament, political parties and civil soci-
ety in the political process. Legislative amendments to 
the changes made since 2011 expanded the powers of 
parliament; since 2019 presidential cabinet appoint-
ments require the prior approval of parliament. The 
same also applies to the appointment of the deputy 
prime minister and the chairs of state committees. 
Since 2020 parliament also votes on the annual budget, 
passing it as a piece of legislation. 
The Development Strategy revamps 
the entire state apparatus. 
Civil society organisations and mass media have 
been given greater freedom under the liberal prin-
ciple of participation. The state administration is to 
be made more transparent, more accessible to the 
citizens and more efficient through the introduction 
of digital processes. As a visible sign of the will to en-
courage “dialogue” and openness online portals have 
been established for citizens to complain,43 submit 
petitions44 and comment on draft laws.45 Such meas-
ures are also designed to improve Uzbekistan’s posi-
tion in international rankings and accelerate the in-
flow of the investment needed for economic reforms.46 
The development strategy was issued as a presiden-
tial decree and is legally binding. Together with its 
 
42 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Uzbekistan 
2nd Quarter 2019 (30 July 2019), 6; German Economic Team, 
“Positive Economic Outlook Thanks to Reform Dynamic”, 
Newsletter 01 (July–August 2019), https://www.german-
economic-team.com/usbekistan/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
6/GET_UZB_NL_01_2019_en.pdf (accessed 2 July 2020). 
43 Virtual’naya Priemnaya Prezidenta [The President’s Virtual 
Reception], https://pm.gov.uz/ru (accessed 2 July 2020). 
44 Mening Fikrim [My opinion], https://meningfikrim.uz 
(accessed 2 July 2020). 
45 See https://regulation.gov.uz/ru (accessed 2 July 2020). 
46 Strategiya Dejstviy po pjati prioritetnym napravleniyam 
(see note 37). 
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annual and sectoral programmes, which define prior-
ities and personal responsibilities, it has set the entire 
state apparatus in motion and initiated a flood of 
regulatory activities. Since 2017 the Decree on the 
Development Strategy has been successively reinforced 
and amplified by further decrees, operational direc-
tives and other subsidiary acts which document – 
and create – an enormous need for legislative co-
ordination in implementing the reform agenda. The 
number of presidential decrees, which lay out legally 
binding political guidelines and instructions, has 
proliferated since 2017, as has the volume of resolu-
tions (postanovlenie) concretising and implementing the 
decrees.47 The bulk of legal acts relate to Areas I and 
III, clearly reflecting their special status in the reform 
process as a whole. The great effort put into regu-
lation demonstrates the will to systematically imple-
ment the strategy – but creates challenges for a 
planned, structured and systematic approach. 
Overregulation is a both consequence and a symp-
tom of a legal system dominated by the executive, 
which has accumulated a multitude of inconsisten-
cies that now impede the reforms.48 The existing legis-
lative process, for example, is poorly prepared for the 
new requirement of public participation. The planned 
reform of the legal system (Area II)49 is supposed to 
eliminate these inconsistencies and synchronise it 
with the objectives of the Development Strategy. This 
venture presupposes a transformation of the legal 
culture and is anything but trivial.50 It can therefore 
be expected to take years. 
The same applies to all aspects of the reforms 
affecting the relationship between state and society. 
But the Development Strategy is not conceived for 
gradualism. It sets out to break path dependencies, 
demanding rapid change and quick, visible results. 
The example of the activities of the Development 
Strategy Centre (DSC) illustrates very well how imple-
mentation of the reform agenda focuses more on 
 
47 In 2016 47 presidential decrees and 84 resolutions were 
issued, in 2017 137 and 364; the numbers subsequently de-
clined slightly. I am grateful to Belinda Nüssel for her quan-
titative and thematic analysis of the legal acts. 
48 OSCE/ODIHR, Preliminary Assessment (see note 35), 40 f. 
49 Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan: Ob utverzhdenii kon-
cepcii sovershenstvovaniya normotvorcheskoy dejatel’nosti [Decree 
of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Confirmation 
of a concept for improving norm-setting], doc. no. UP-5505, 
8 August 2018, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3858812 (accessed 2 July 
2020). 
50 OSCE/ODIHR, Preliminary Assessment (see note 35), 45 f. 
activity and visibility than structure and coherence. 
Established in February 2017 by presidential order as 
an NGO,51 the DSC is supposed to prepare practical 
measures for realising the development goals, work-
ing together with experts and civil society groups and 
in close coordination with the National Commission 
that is formally responsible for implementing the 
strategy. A coordinating council composed largely of 
representatives of the presidential apparatus and the 
ministerial bureaucracy is responsible for supporting 
the DSC in its work and facilitating its cooperation 
with the state organs. The Centre is funded through 
state sources and external contributions from domes-
tic and international state and non-state organisa-
tions. 
The Development Strategy Centre describes itself as 
a think-tank with watchdog functions,52 and operates 
as an intermediary between government and society. 
It communicates the requirements of state policy to 
society and reflects the latter’s reactions back to the 
political sphere in the form of recommendations. At 
the same time the DSC exhibits characteristics com-
parable to those of Western development agencies: 
It operates as umbrella organisation and point of con-
tact for a broad spectrum of foreign actors seeking 
fields of activity and cooperation partners in Uzbeki-
stan. Correspondingly diverse are the activities that 
the DSC has conducted since 2017 in the service of the 
reform agenda. Two areas are particularly prominent: 
organising events to mobilise media and youth – in 
other words public relations – and preparing project 
proposals in collaboration with domestic and foreign 
partners. The latter include a wide range of actors, 
such as the German Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) along with the World Bank, 
the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) and the Chinese company Huawei.53 
In terms of topics the spectrum is just as wide-
ranging, if not to say scattered. Conferences in pres-
 
51 Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan Ob organiza-
cionnych merach po realizacii Strategii Dejstviy po pyati prioritetnym 
napravleniyam razvityja Respubliki Uzbekistan v 2017–2021 
godach [Order of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: 
On organisational measures for realising the Development 
Strategy for Uzbekistan 2017–2011], doc. no. R-4849, 14 
February 2017, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3114490 (accessed 2 July 
2020). 
52 Discussion with the Director of the DSC in February 
2020 in Berlin. 
53 The DSC website provides a summary of activities since 
2017: https://strategy.uz/ (accessed 2 July 2020). 
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tigious venues with up to three hundred often promi-
nent participants address a plethora of issues ranging 
from religious policy, judicial and administrative 
reform to digitalisation. Although they all stand in 
some relation to the Development Strategy and its 
annual priorities, little in the way of systematisation 
is discernible. Variety is perceived as proof of the 
new “openness” that is now part and parcel of Uzbek 
politics, absolutely positively connoted, and an im-
portant aspect of the national image at home and 
abroad. The concept of “openness” points in turn 
to the complexity and potential reach of the reform 
agenda, which generates high expectations and pres-
sure to demonstrate progress. The DSC is active here 
too, with attractive brochures presenting activities 
undertaken and results achieved in specific policy 
areas and periods.54 
 
54 See for example: Development Strategy Center, The Time 
of Development: 2019: Outcomes for January–September 2019, 
Online version at https://strategy.uz/index.php?news=709& 
lang=en (accessed 2 July 2020). 
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The ambitious and highly complex programme of 
state-led and centrally controlled liberalisation, with 
which Uzbekistan’s new ruler intends to lead the 
country forwards, goes further than legislative, organi-
sational and technical adjustments. If it is to be effec-
tive, the reform agenda also needs to be taken on 
board and internalised by all involved. The demand 
for political participation by civil society in particular 
requires behavioural adjustments on the part of both 
the political protagonists and society at large, which 
will not come about automatically. If Uzbekistan’s 
transformation is to succeed, actors with very differ-
ent interests need to support the agenda and partici-
pate in its realisation. The strategy itself reflects this 
requirement, emphasising the inclusivity and rep-
resentativeness of the reform agenda and presenting 
it as the outcome of the president’s discussions and 
consultations with all relevant actors.55 
Simply presenting a reform programme does not in 
itself, however, create the social consensus the Devel-
opment Strategy will require. In fact, the point of 
many of the changes is to establish such a consensus 
in the first place and secure the necessary backing in 
society and among the elites. Three groups of insti-
tutional actors in particular need to be won over: the 
security institutions, leading cadres and civil society. 
These therefore form the heart of the reforms and are 
exposed to correspondingly strong pressure to change. 
The political decision-making structures and the 
framework of political institutions itself, on the other 
hand, remain excluded from significant innovation. 
Reorganisation of the Security Apparatus 
Speculation about rivalries within President Kari-
mov’s inner circle began long before the change 
of leadership.56 Few details reached the public, of 
 
55 Strategiya Dejstviy po pjati prioritetnym napravleniyam 
(see note 37). 
56 Shawn Snow, “After Islam Karimov, What Next? Uzbeki-
stan’s Succession Question”, The Diplomat, 30 August 2016, 
course, still less verifiable facts. Alongside then Prime 
Minister Mirziyoyev, two other members of the core 
elite occupied positions of significant power: Rustam 
Azimov, first deputy prime minister and long-serving 
finance minister, regarded like Mirziyoyev as a tech-
nocrat and “moderniser”; and Rustam Inoyatov, head 
of the National Security Service (SNB).57 The SNB’s 
powers were significantly expanded in 2005 after 
Inoyatov’s predecessor Zokir Almatov was dismissed 
following the massacre in Andijan. The relationship 
between Inoyatov and Almatov – who had headed 
the Interior Ministry and its police force since 1991 – 
had already been regarded as fractious, with both 
competing for powers and resources to which their 
respective institutions enjoyed privileged access.58 
After Almatov’s dismissal Inoyatov in effect con-
trolled the entire security apparatus. His SNB had a 
reputation for overreach and unpredictability and 
was feared by governing politicians and citizens alike. 
Inoyatov was not said to hold ambitions of succeeding 
to the presidency himself, but he was regarded as a 
power broker with decisive influence over Karimov’s 
succession.59 
Mirziyoyev already began reshuffling the cabinet 
while interim president. Sweeping changes and new 
appointments at all levels of the executive followed 
after his official inauguration in December 2016.60 
Azimov lost his post as finance minister within the 
month and in June 2017 also resigned as deputy 
prime minister; many of his long-serving appointees 
in the Finance Ministry were also replaced a few 
months later.61 But the most significant changes 
 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/after-islam-karimov-what-
next-uzbekistans-succession-question/ (accessed 2 July 2020). 
57 Official Uzbek designation: Sluzhba Nacional’noj Bezo-
pasnosti (SNB). 
58 See above, p. 9. 
59 Snow, “After Islam Karimov” (see note 56). 
60 Legal acts concerning changes in personnel, mostly 
decrees (ukaz) and resolutions (postanovlenie), are listed at: 
https://lex.uz (accessed 2 July 2020). 
61 “Hundreds Fired from Uzbek Finance Ministry after 
President’s Criticism”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
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affected the security apparatus, which Mirziyoyev 
subjected to a systematic and apparently strategically 
planned reorganisation in the course of which the 
powers of the SNB were curtailed, the role of the Pros-
ecutor General expanded and a new structure in-
stalled that is tailored specifically to the president.62 
Mirziyoyev brought former interior minister Almatov 
out of retirement in December 2016, appointing him 
first as head of a state anti-corruption commission, 
later as advisor to the interior minister.63 In May 2017 
the armed units of the SNB (20,000 men) were trans-
ferred back to the Interior Ministry, which had been 
forced to relinquish them following the Andijan 
massacre.64 
Purges within the SNB began in summer 2017 in 
the provinces.65 Arrests in the headquarters and the 
regions followed in January 2018, before Inoyatov 
himself was removed on 31 January 2018. Instead of 
prosecution, Inoyatov was made a senator and thus 
granted a position conferring status and political 
immunity. There was speculation66 that Inoyatov had 
 
27 December 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-
finance-ministry-mass-firing-after-president-criticism/ 
28942439. html (accessed 3 July 2020). 
62 “Prezident provel zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti” 
[President holds a session of the Security Council], Gazeta, 11 
January 2018, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/01/11/security-
council/ (accessed 3 July 2020). 
63 “Zokirzhon Almatov korruptsiyaga qarshi kurashadi” 
[Zokirjon Almatov declares war on corruption], Kun, 21 
December 2016, https://kun.uz/news/2016/12/21/zokirzon-
almatov-korrupciaga-karsi-kurasadi; “Zakirzhon Almatov 
naznachen sovetnikom glavy MVD” [Zakirzhon Almatov 
appointed advisor to interior minister], Gazeta, 27 February 
2018, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/02/27/mvd/ (both 
accessed 3 July 2020). 
64 “Uzbekistan: Security Services Lose Elite Units”, Eurasia-
net, 7 February 2018, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-
security-services-lose-elite-units (accessed 3 July 2020). 
65 For details see Anna Kozyrova, “Ispugannye i Razoren-
nye: Nasledie Inoyatova izgonyayut iz silovych struktur 
Uzbekistana” [The fearful and the ruined: Inoyatov’s legacy 
driven out of Uzbekistan’s security agencies], Fergana, 9 
March 2018, https://www.fergananews.com/articles/9843; 
Rafael Sattarov, “Vidimost’ Lyustracii: Zachem vlasti Uzbeki-
stana nachali massovye chistki silovikov” [The appearance of 
a lustration: Why Uzbekistan’s rulers have started a mass 
purge of the security authorities], Moskovskij Centr Karnegi, 28 
September 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77365 (both 
accessed 3 July 2020). 
66 Alisher Ilchamov, “Politicheskaya sistema Uzbekistana 
vse eshche pokoitsya na neformal’noy tabeli o rangach” 
been treated with kid gloves in return for supporting 
Mirziyoyev’s candidacy as interim president in Sep-
tember 2016, and thus paving the way for a consen-
sual transition. In view of the power and authority 
the head of the intelligence service must have wielded, 
such interpretations are certainly plausible. 
In the aftermath of the sequence of events described 
above, the National Security Service (SNB) was reorgan-
ised and renamed the State Security Service (SGB). Its 
legal status, responsibilities, powers, funding and 
technical resources are now governed by a law that 
was adopted by parliament on 15 March 2018 and 
came into effect within weeks on 6 April.67 Prosecutor 
General Ichtiyor Abdullaev was appointed to lead the 
new authority, but was not to last long. In February 
2019 he in turn was accused of abuse of power and 
corruption and in September sentenced to eighteen 
years in prison.68 Countless members of the intelli-
gence service, public prosecutors and tax inspectors, 
many of them linked by family or business relation-
ships, were prosecuted during President Mirziyoyev’s 
first three years and sentenced in camera, in most 
cases for abuse of power, corruption and large-scale 
illegal business dealings. The published details of the 
indictments convey an impression of the modus op-
erandi of Karimov-era patronage networks – which 
extended into the top leadership.69 Huge sums dis-
appeared into private bank accounts, often abroad. 
The state’s desire to retrieve these resources is one of 
 
[Uzbekistan’s political system is still based on an informal 
ranking], Aziys’kiy Monitor, 29 October 2019, https://cacds.org. 
ua/?p=8160 (accessed 3 July 2020). 
67 “Nazad v Budushchee: Zachem sodtrudnikov SGB Uz-
bekistana sdelali neprikosvennymi” [Back to the future: 
What do members of Uzbekistan’s state security service need 
immunity for?], Fergana, 10 April 2018, https://www.fergana 
news.com/articles/9893. The Law of 5 April 2018 can be 
found under identifier SRU-471 in the Justice Ministry data-
base: https://lex.uz (both accessed 3 July 2020). 
68 “Eks-glava specsluzhb Uzbekistana progovoren k 18 
godam tyurmy” [Former head of Uzbekistan’s intelligence 
service sentenced to 18 years imprisonment], Radio Ozodlik, 
28 September 2019, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30187741.html 
(accessed 3 July 2020). 
69 Sattarov, “Vidimost’ Ljustracii” (see note 65); Kozyrova, 
“Ispugannye i Razorenny” (see note 65); Aziz Jakubov, “Snova 
‘Bol’shoy Brat’’: Zaymet li genprokuratura Uzbekistana mes-
to Karimovskoy SNB” [Another “big brother’: Is Uzbekistan’s 
Prosecutor General taking the place of Karimov’s SNB?], Fer-
gana, 10 August 2018, https://www.fergananews.com/articles/ 
10114 (accessed 3 July 2020). 
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the motives behind the reorganisation of the security 
apparatus.70 
While the responsibilities of the SGB were curtailed 
in the course of the purges, the powers and staff of 
the Prosecutor General were expanded. The Prosecu-
tor General now occupies a key role monitoring im-
plementation of the reforms and coordinates closely 
with the tax and customs authorities.71 Mirziyoyev 
has also exploited the security service reorganisation 
to establish a system in which two closely linked elite 
units – the National Guard and the State Security 
Service of the President (GSBP) – have taken over 
central tasks of the former intelligence service. 
The new central organ of the structures responsible 
for internal security is the National Guard, a paramili-
tary formation that was hived off from the Interior 
Ministry’s armed forces in 1992 and placed under the 
Defence Ministry. The remit of this elite unit, which 
numbers about one thousand men, was both broad 
and unspecific, but consisted principally in protecting 
the president and guarding strategically important 
sites.72 It was also deployed in counter-terrorism oper-
ations.73 In August 2017 the National Guard was 
taken out of the armed forces, expanded and granted 
the status of an independent force. Its mandate has 
been successively expanded and now includes genu-
ine police responsibilities such as maintaining public 
order during rallies and demonstrations, manhunts 
and criminal investigations, as well as controlling the 
import, dissemination and export of arms. Legislation 
to codify the various legal changes is in preparation.74 
The safety and security of President Mirziyoyev and 
his family are the responsibility of the GSBP. It repre-
 
70 Sattarov, “Vidimost’ Lyustracii” (see note 65). 
71 For details see Jakubov, “Snova ‘Bol’shoy Brat’’” 
(see note 69). 
72 The Law Establishing the National Guard of 23 January 
1992 can be found under identifier 29 (29-son) in the Justice 
Ministry database (https://lex.uz [accessed 3 July 2020]). 
73 “Prezident provel zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti” 
(see note 62). 
74 “Zakon o Nacgvardii odobren senatorami” [Law on 
National Guard passes Senate], Gazeta, 14 December 2019, 
https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/12/14/security/; “Nacional’naya 
gvardiya Uzbekistana poluchit novye polnomochiya” [Uzbek 
National Guard granted new powers], Podrobno, 19 March 2020, 
https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/natsionalnaya-gvardiya-
uzbekistana-poluchit-novye-polnomochiya-/ (both accessed 
3 July 2020). 
sents a kind of praetorian guard,75 and since a legis-
lative amendment in September 2019 is also respon-
sible for criminal investigations and prevention in 
cases involving “the president’s security” – a catch-
all vague enough to justify almost any deployment.76 
Relatives of the president feature prominently in 
the leadership of both units. Major-General Batyr 
Tursunov, who helped establish the National Guard, 
is related by marriage to Mirziyoyev,77 and can look 
back at a long career in the Interior Ministry police 
and the intelligence services.78 Another son-in-law of 
the president is second in command of the GSBP.79 
As can be seen, the president’s reorganisation of the 
security apparatus creates a structure that serves not 
least to secure his personal power. 
Cadre Policy and Governance 
Close confidants of Mirziyoyev are also found in other 
important posts, for example in leading positions in 
the presidential administration.80 They include Prime 
 
75 The analogy is pointed out by Aziz Jakubov, “Kto nynche 
na Brodvee glavnyy” [Who’s playing the lead on Broadway 
now], Fergana, 10 September 2019, https://fergana.agency/ 
articles/110646/?country=uz (accessed 3 July 2020). 
76 “Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Mirzieeva vozmet opponentov 
prezidenta na karandash” [Mirziyoyev’s security service 
turns attention to President’s opponents], Fergana, 6 Septem-
ber 2019, https://fergana.agency/news/110595/. The Law of 
5 September 2019 can be found under identifier SRU-564 
in the Justice Ministry database: https://lex.uz (both accessed 
3 July 2020). 
77 “In Uzbekistan, National Guard Turned into a Personal 
Army of the President”, Analytical Center for Central Asia, 4 No-
vember 2019, https://acca.media/en/in-uzbekistan-national-
guard-turned-into-a-personal-army-of-the-president/ (accessed 
3 July 2020). 
78 “Tursunov Batyr Radzhabovich”, https://centrasia.org/ 
person2.php?st=1549443471; “Ojbek Tursunov”, Mezon, 
https://mezon.io/tag/ojbek-tursunov/ (both accessed 3 July 
2020). 
79 Otabek Umarov is an afficionado of martial arts, espe-
cially Mixed Martial Arts (MMA), and until August 2020 
headed various sports bodies (MMA, Triathlon); “President’s 
Son-in-law to Head New Central Asian MMA Confederation”, 
Tashkent Times, 11 February 2020, https://tashkenttimes.uz/ 
sports/4960-president-s-son-in-law-to-head-new-central-asian-
mma-confederation (accessed 3 July 2020). 
80 “Derzhat sovet: Kto budet upravlyat’ Uzbekistanom 
vmeste s prezidentom” [The advisors: Who governs Uzbeki-
stan together with the President?], Fergana, 3 September 
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Minister Abdulla Aripov, Deputy Chairperson of the 
Senate Sadyk Safaev and Komil Allamjanov, an ex-
perienced media functionary. They are all of great 
significance for the external representation of Mirzi-
yoyev’s reform policies.81 What connects these rep-
resentatives of the political elite is not least the active 
role that they – like Mirziyoyev himself – played in 
the old system. The protagonists of this “old guard” 
are of elementary importance for the president’s 
power base, as exemplified by the reintegration of 
former interior minister Almatov into the police 
apparatus. 
Mirziyoyev’s supporters also include influential 
business figures who actively push the economic 
reform agenda, are centrally involved in the imple-
mentation of projects and help to secure Mirziyoyev’s 
reforms simply by creating visible facts on the ground. 
Jahongir Artykhojayev for example, since 2018 sena-
tor in the upper chamber and mayor of Tashkent, is 
publicly responsible for the Tashkent City business 
centre, a contract worth about US$1.3 billion whose 
realisation is proceeding rapidly. But several firms 
owned by Artykhojayev are also commercially involved 
in the project.82 The billionaire Alisher Usmanov is 
probably the most prominent champion of Mirziyo-
yev’s political course. An Uzbek by birth who lives 
in Russia and has family ties to the Uzbek president, 
Usmanov is founder and part owner of the Russian-
registered holding company USM, which owns stakes 
in major Russian enterprises.83 By his own account 
he has invested “several hundred million dollars” 
in Uzbekistan, “to help the new president and his 
team”.84 Usmanov is also said to possess a degree of 
political influence over the Uzbek president, espe-
cially in relation to his policies towards Russia. 
Alongside the politically seasoned representatives 
of his own generation, on whose loyalty the president 
 
2018, https://www.fergananews.com/articles/10156 (accessed 
11 July 2020). 
81 Ilchamov, “Politicheskaya sistema Uzbekistana” 
(see note 66). 
82 Kristian Lasslett, “Uzbekistan Ltd: Private-public Inter-
ests Clash in Flagship Project”, Open Democracy, 29 January 
2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/uzbekistan-ltd/ 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
83 See the company’s website: https://usm-group.com/ 
company (accessed 11 July 2020). 
84 Henry Foy, “Alisher Usmanov: ‘I Was Never What You 
Could Call an Oligarch’”, Financial Times, 3 January 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/a472f9e6-28c6-11ea-9305-
4234e74b0ef3 (accessed 11 July 2020). 
can count to guard his interests in both the civil 
service and the security structures, Mirziyoyev has 
integrated younger specialists into his team. These 
representatives of the post-Soviet generation – mostly 
economists and jurists who studied at elite universi-
ties and gained work experience both at home and 
abroad – are crucial for realisation of the reform 
agenda They include Justice Minister Ruslanbek Dav-
letov and Sardor Umurzakov, Deputy Prime Minister 
for Investments and Foreign Economic Relations. 
These comparatively young individuals identify 
wholeheartedly with the reform agenda and operate 
in the conviction that they are doing the right thing.85 
They are also represented in the presidential adminis-
tration and in think tanks involved in implementa-
tion of the reform agenda, like the DSC. With their 
fundamentally liberal attitude, their enthusiasm, 
their familiarity with the language of international 
development and their admiration for the president 
they embody the spirit and objectives of the reform 
programme and are able to communicate them 
credibly at home and abroad.86 
But staff of that calibre remain a minority in the 
civil service. Most public officials were socialised in a 
system whose culture was worlds apart from the one 
Mirziyoyev is seeking to establish. In his inaugural 
address to parliament on 14 December 2016 he laid 
out the attitudes and conduct he expected from his 
cadres.87 The ceremonial speech, which was largely 
intended to prepare his audience for the upcoming 
reforms, ended with sharp criticism of the attitudes 
of state cadres. In the past, he said, outmoded attitude 
had prevented “rational” and “efficient” deployment. 
Too many staff had merely “simulated” activity, while 
personnel had been lacking in important areas. It was 
time, he said, to cultivate a new generation of public 
 
85 Catherine Putz, “Uzbekistan: Reforms on the Right Path: 
An Exclusive Interview with Uzbek Minister of Justice Rus-
lanbek Davletov”, The Diplomat, 16 May 2018, https://the 
diplomat.com/2018/05/uzbekistan-reforms-on-the-right-path/ 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
86 Discussions with representatives of the Uzbek think 
tanks in Tashkent and Berlin (2019/20). 
87 “Svobodnoe, demokraticheskoe i procvetajushchee gosu-
darstvo Uzbekistan my postroim vmeste s nashim muzhest-
vennym i blagorodnym narodom” [We will build free, demo-
cratic and prospering Uzbekistan with our courageous and 
magnanimous people], address by President Mirziyoyev to 
joint session of lower chamber and senate, 14 December 2016, 
https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/111 (accessed 11 July 2020) 
(English: https://president.uz/en/lists/view/111). 
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officials, with a “professional attitude to work”, 
“modern ways of thinking” and “vision”, who are 
capable of achieving objectives. Not least, the pro-
portion of women in all state functions needed to 
be increased. 
The president repeated his criticisms at the first, 
extended meeting of the cabinet in January 2017.88 
For much too long the state administration had been 
characterised by an unrealistic and superficial “cabi-
net style”, he said, where staff had seen themselves 
principally as advocates of their agency or ministry, 
rather than representing the interests of the state. It 
was now time to establish a new “behavioural norm” 
characterised by “critical analysis, strict discipline and 
personal responsibility”, especially in the executive 
grades. The president went on to warn the govern-
ment and parliament that the “reconstruction of state 
and society” proposed in the reform agenda would 
demand a “qualitatively completely new” attitude to 
the needs of the population. Politicians and officials 
would have to break with the past, engage properly 
with the situation on the ground and “enter into dia-
logue with all population groups”. He said he expected 
law enforcement authorities and regional administra-
tions in particular to change their attitudes and bear 
in mind that “not the people are to serve the state, 
but the state is to serve the people”. 
So what Mirziyoyev wants to introduce in the state 
administration is nothing less than a working style 
characterised by an ethics of responsibility as a cen-
tral element of good governance. That requires train-
ing and education. The task of the Agency for Civil 
Service Development established by presidential 
decree in October 2019 is to ensure that the staff of 
state organs and agencies receive such (re)training.89 
A presidential advisor heads the Agency, which is 
also responsible for preparing a fundamental reform 
of the civil service and coordinating state personnel 
policy across the board. One of the priorities is to 
introduce a competitive selection process and to sys-
tematise performance assessments The state-run 
Nation’s Hope Foundation (El-yurt umidi), which has 
 
88 Kriticheskiy analiz, zhestkaya disciplina i personal’naya otvetst-
vennost’ (see note 12). 
89 Agenstvo Razvitiya Gosudarstvennoj Sluzhby (ARGOS). 
Decree UP-5843 of 3 October 2019 available at https:// 
lex.uz/ru/docs/4549993; see also “U Mirzieeva posyavilsya 
ARGOS dlja kontrolja chinovnikov” [Under Mirziyoyev 
ARGOS established to control officials], Fergana, 4 October 
2019, https://fergana.agency/news/111393/?country=uz 
(both accessed 11 July 2020). 
been funding young academics to study abroad since 
1993, now falls under the responsibility of the new 
Agency for Civil Service Development in order to 
accelerate the training of highly qualified young spe-
cialists and to recruit as many of them as possible 
to the civil service. Efforts are also under way to per-
suade Uzbeks who have built a career abroad to 
return and place their talents at the service of the 
reforms.90 
Preceding this development, the Prosecutor Gen-
eral announced in August 2019 that all staff in the 
state administration would be required to participate 
in courses on ethics, conflicts of interest and anti-cor-
ruption methods. The background to this is that the 
media liberalisation has seen growing coverage of com-
plaints concerning abuses of power in public offices. 
The regional hokims,91 who frequently bypass legal 
channels to enforce their decisions and are known to 
resort to violence, have come in for particularly wide-
spread criticism.92 The president has repeatedly under-
lined that the authoritarian style of the hokims is 
no longer acceptable and publicly criticised their mis-
conduct.93 However, the hokims – in whose appoint-
ment the local parliaments (kengesh) also have a say 
since a reform in 201794 – play a key role in regional 
 
90 “Umidovcy iz raznych stran vossoedinyatsya po inicia-
tive fonda “El-Yurt Umidi” [Umid scholarship-holders from 
various countries meet at initiative of El-yurt umidi Foun-
dation], Kultura, 5 December 2019, https://kultura.uz/view_ 
2_r_14363.html (accessed 11 July 2020). 
91 In this publication I use the Anglicised plural of hokim 
rather than the linguistically correct hokimlar. 
92 “Chokimiyaty i vlast’: chto dumayut uzbekistancy o 
svoich chokimach” [The power of the hokimat: What Uzbeks 
think about their hokims], Kun, 21 May 2019, https://kun.uz/ 
ru/news/2019/05/21/xokimiyaty-i-vlast-chto-dumayut-uzbeki 
stansy-o-svoix-xokimax; “Genprokuratura Uzbekistana oza-
botilas’ sluzhebnoy etikoy chinovnikov” [Prosecutor General 
concerned about civil service ethics], Fergana, 16 August 2019, 
https://fergana.agency/news/109955/ (both accessed 11 July 
2020). 
93 “Uzbek Leader Disparages Governors over House Demo-
litions”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 5 August 2019; “Mirzi-
yoyev poruchil chinovnikam kardinal’no peresmotret’ metody 
svoey raboty” [Mirziyoyev tells civil servants to change their 
working methods], Kun, 14 August 2019, https://kun.uz/ru/ 
news/2019/08/14/mirziyoyev-poruchil-chinovnikam-kardi 
nalno-peresmotret-metody-svoyey-raboty (accessed 11 July 
2020). 
94 Under the amended Law on Local Governments of 1993 
(https://www.lex.uz/acts/112168, accessed 11 July 2020) the 
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power structures and are in a position to severely dis-
rupt implementation of reforms. So for those reasons, 
and for lack of alternatives, Mirziyoyev is sticking 
with them. In fact their responsibilities are to be ex-
panded, giving them the task of implementing eco-
nomic reform measures on the ground themselves 
rather than simply following instructions from the 
central authorities. But local parliaments are also to 
be given the power to remove hokims by vote of no 
confidence.95 The hokims are already legally account-
able to the local parliaments in relation to plans for 
implementing reform projects and progress reports, 
but this is plainly not taken seriously enough on the 
ground. The president regularly calls for greater 
transparency, also vis-à-vis the mass media and the 
wider public.96 
Aside from the head of state’s direct pedagogical 
interventions and institutional incentives for reedu-
cating existing cadres, great import is placed on in-
vestment in the education system to create the per-
sonnel required in the longer term to reshape the 
country. The government hopes to tap expertise from 
abroad to bring curricula, teaching materials and 
assessment systems up to international standards, 
and also intends to double the number of study 
grants to increase the proportion of young people 
with university degrees. This applies above all to 
subjects of practical relevance.97 
Public Mobilisation 
Alongside a revamped personnel policy, popular 
mobilisation plays a central role in securing compli-
ance and legitimacy for the reform programme. One 
early sign of this was that the first reform year was 
dedicated to “dialogue” with society. Here the strategy 
 
hokims are elected by the local parliaments “after consul-
tation with the president”. 
95 At least according to the proposal for a reform of the 
Law on Local Governments: “Zakon o gosvlasti na mestach 
primut v novoy redakcii” [Law on Local Governments to 
be revised], Aloqada, 24 May 2019, http://www.aloqada.com/ 
News/2019/05/24/zakon-o-nbsp-gosvlasti-na-nbsp-mestakh-
primut-v-nbsp-novoy-redakcii (accessed 11 July 2020). 
96 “Poslanie Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan Shavkata 
Mirzieeva Oliy Mazhlisu” [Text of President Shavkat Mirzi-
yoyev’s address to the Oliy Majlis], 24 January 2020, https:// 
president.uz/ru/lists/view/3324 (accessed 11 July 2020) (Eng-
lish: https://president.uz/en/lists/view/3324). 
97 Ibid. 
operates on two fronts: with the citizenry and within 
the state organs. Confidence in the state is to be con-
solidated by introducing the principle that office 
holders are accountable to the public, while reducing 
bureaucratic obstacles should create accessibility and 
make it easier for citizens to take their concerns to 
the authorities. Public events concerning the reform 
programme are to involve relevant population groups 
as well as representatives of the state. 
The organisation of such events is to be entrusted 
to specially founded organisations whose purpose is 
principally to mobilise the population for the reform 
programme. One of these “government NGOs” 
(GoNGOs), the DSC, has already been discussed above 
(see p. 13 f.). It runs information events on the topics 
and “results” of the reforms to create “a positive image” 
of the modernisation policy and also get on board 
those who “are still inactive and have not yet under-
stood that everyone should be participating and con-
tributing”.98 
Similar objectives are pursued by the Yuksalish 
(Progress) Movement, which was founded in February 
2019 – again by the government.99 On its website 
Yuksalish presents itself as a “voluntary association” 
of citizens and NGOs seeking to inform the country 
about the reform programme and encourage popular 
participation.100 The movement, whose activity pro-
file is as broad as the DSC’s, works to network state 
and non-state actors and institutions. It is apparently 
also intending to establish itself as an umbrella or-
ganisation for the NGO sector, because smaller NGO 
operating outside the state structures still experience 
difficulties in Uzbekistan.101 But with its official man-
date and offices in all regions Yuksalish is well posi-
tioned to absorb the grassroots sector and – in the 
context of the state reform policies – to become a 
kind of super-GoNGO. 
 
98 Discussion with DSC Director, February 2020, Berlin. 
99 Postanovlenie Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Uzbekistan, O 
merach po organizacii dejatel’nosti negosudarstvennoy nekommerch-
eskoy organizacii – Obshchenacional’noe dvizhenie “Yuksalish” i ego 
territorial’nych podrazdeleniy [Resolution of the Cabinet of Min-
isters of the Republic of Uzbekistan, on measures to organise 
the activities of the non-state, non-profit movement “Yuk-
salish” and its territorial subdivisions], 13 February 2019, 
no. 124, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4200154 (accessed 11 July 2020). 
100 See https://yumh.uz (accessed 11 July 2020). 
101 A draft law of January 2020 has to date done nothing 
to change this. “NGO Bill Criticised as ‘Bureaucratic Red 
Tape’”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 23 January 2020. 
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As can be seen, the idea of participation becomes 
an instrument of social engineering in this context, a 
tool of social “reeducation” in support of the reform 
policies. The imperative character of the offer of 
participation is also discernible in the president’s 
speeches, where he regularly reminds his compatriots 
that “all reforms must originate from society” and 
that society must therefore develop “more activity 
and initiative”, “entrepreneurial spirit” and “business 
acumen”.102 Such virtues were shunned by the Soviet-
era command state and its planned economy – but 
are vital for the liberal market economy the president 
is working towards. Uzbeks are being told to rethink, 
to mobilise their “inner reserves”, to do their utmost, 
and to display the kind of determination and stamina 
that the nation has often demonstrated in the course 
of its history. Only then can the objective of “radical 
improvement in living conditions for everyone” be 
achieved.103 “It depends on you,” is the implicit mes-
sage of these speeches, in which the president appeals 
to his compatriots to back his policies. 
The third pillar of the mobilisation offensive is 
the mass media. Liberalisation of the media sector is 
regarded as an outstanding achievement of Mirziyo-
yev’s reform policies. Compared to the strict censor-
ship imposed under Karimov, the media do indeed 
enjoy significantly greater freedom. The official com-
mitment to freedom of speech and Mirziyoyev’s own 
willingness to address problems has encouraged the 
emergence of a lively blogging scene in Uzbekistan.104 
It is has become easier for foreign journalists to gain 
accreditation and media outlets that had been blocked 
in Uzbekistan since the unrest in Andijan in 2005 are 
now available again. These include Deutsche Welle, 
the BBC’s Uzbek service, Eurasianet and Fergana, as 
well as Uzmetronom which offers a forum for critical 
internet journalism in Uzbekistan. Access to the web-
sites of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Inter-
national has also been restored. 
 
102 Examples: “Svobodnoe, demokraticheskoe i procveta-
jushchee gosudarstvo” (see note 87); “Poslanie Prezidenta” 
(see note 96). 
103 “Poslanie Prezidenta” (see note 96). 
104 Umida Hashimova, “A New Era for Press Freedom in 
a Changing Uzbekistan?” The Diplomat, 8 July 2019, https:// 
thediplomat.com/2019/07/a-new-era-for-press-freedom-in-a-
changing-uzbekistan/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 
New liberties come with new 
restrictions. 
There are also restrictions, however, with repeated 
reports of pressure applied to journalists and human 
rights activists who publicise local grievances.105 In-
timidation and detention of journalists and bloggers 
repeatedly casts doubts over the official commitment 
to freedom of expression.106 A scandal involving the 
mayor of Tashkent, Artykhojayev, threw a particularly 
sharp light on the way representatives of the state in-
teract with the media. During a debate Artykhojayev 
grossly insulted and massively threatened three re-
porters from the news portal Kun.uz. The discussion 
was secretly recorded and subsequently disseminat-
ed.107 The authorities investigated and concluded that 
the mayor’s insults represented a violation of ethical 
norms but not a crime.108 The Agency for Information 
and Mass Communication (AIMK), which is part of 
the presidential administration and implements the 
state media policy, also intervened – with an appeal 
to bloggers and journalists not to overdramatise the 
affair.109 
Such reactions starkly expose the limits of the new 
media freedom. The Development Strategy explicitly 
states that the mass media, including internet chan-
nels, should explain the reform agenda and its objec-
tives to the population – meaning the “deepening of 
democratic reforms”, “the protection of human rights 
and liberties”, and the introduction of principles of 
rule of law, peace and “the common good”.110 In other 
words, the media are supposed to present the public 
with a positive image of the state’s policies. The AIMK 
sees itself as a mediating instance, supporting the 
 
105 BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Highlights from Central 
Asian Press, Websites, 27 June 2019. 
106 Examples: “Uzbekistan: Government Still Restricting 
Free Reporting”, Eurasianet, 10 October 2019, https://eurasia 
net.org/uzbekistan-government-still-restricting-free-reporting 
(accessed 11 July 2020); “Facebook User ‘Abducted, Beaten’ 
for Comments”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Highlights from 
Central Asian Press, Websites, 17 December 2019. 
107 “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Mayor’s Outburst Shocks 
Reporters”, Eurasianet, 18 November 2019, https://eurasia 
net.org/uzbekistan-tashkent-mayors-outburst-shocks-
reporters (accessed 11 July 2020). 
108 “‘No Signs of Crime’ in Uzbek Mayor’s Threats to 
Reporters”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 27 November 2019. 
109 “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Mayor’s Outburst” (see note 107). 
110 Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan: Strategii Deystviy 
(see note 36), items 6–8. 
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media in information-gathering, communicating with 
state instances and ensuring that reporting is “con-
structive”.111 
Media receive targeted state support as long as they 
fulfil these conditions. In August 2019 more than one 
hundred popular bloggers and influencers from across 
the world were invited to Uzbekistan to promote 
the country as a tourist destination. The Uzbek state 
spent about US$250,000 on the event, hoping that the 
influencers’ huge followings would create a signifi-
cant marketing effect.112 The president himself met 
with the bloggers to explain Uzbekistan’s “politics of 
openness” and to convey his expectation that they 
would present his reform policies in a positive light.113 
In the same vein, the press departments of public 
bodies are instructed to respond to critical reporting 
rather than ignoring it. On the one hand they are 
supposed to take criticism seriously, verify its veracity 
and convey it to the responsible instances; on the 
other they are encouraged to provide the media with 
material enabling them to “correct” their reports.114 
Active media policy is the motto. 
In December 2019 the registration of television and 
radio stations and print and digital media was simpli-
fied in the interest of better interaction between state 
agencies and mass media. Licence applications no 
longer have to be presented to AIMK in a cumber-
some and time consuming procedure, but can be sub-
mitted at the service centres that have been set up 
across the country since 2018 to centralise and digi-
talise information flows and transactions between 
politics, administration and citizens. The relevant 
resolution, which was prepared by AIMK, also intro-
duced a series of arrangements designed to give 
journalists better protection against the authorities.115 
The media policy is a good example of the ambiva-
lence of the Uzbek reform programme. Liberalisation 
 
111 “Uzbekistan Explains Why Radio Liberty’s Uzbek Web-
site Blocked”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 21 May 2019. 
112 Todd Prince, “Uzbekistan Turns to Foreign Social-Media 
Stars to Boost Tourism”, RFE/RL, 23 September 2019, https:// 
www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-tourism-foreign-social-media-
stars-to-boost-tourism/30176880.html (accessed 11 July 2020). 
113 “Uzbek Leader Vows to Support Bloggers”, BBC Monitor-
ing Central Asia, 27 August 2019. 
114 “Uzbek State Press Secretaries Rebuked for Lack of 
Reporting”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 6 October 2019. 
115 “V Uzbekistane uprostili registraciju SMI” [Registration 
of mass media eased in Uzbekistan], Fergana, 23 December 
2019, https://fergana.ru/news/113670/?country=uz (accessed 
11 July 2020). 
in this sector does not serve only, as occasionally in-
sinuated by Western experts, to enhance the effi-
ciency of state control over citizens, in the sense of 
refining the methods of authoritarian rule.116 In fact 
the encouragement of public engagement in Uzbeki-
stan, in however controlled a form, is also directed 
towards the political executive and the cadres – not 
least with the intention of employing media scrutiny 
to motivate them to internalise the reform objec-
tives.117 To reduce this to the perfecting of authoritar-
ian rule fails to do justice to the complexity of the 
reforms. Responsible, lawful governance demanded 
by and benefitting the population is certainly a core 
interest. At the same time, greater freedoms also 
naturally increase the need for regulation, for exam-
ple to respond to defamation and deliberate disinfor-
mation, especially online.118 
A Public Fund for Support and Development of 
National Mass Media was founded in February 2020, 
apparently as a response to the new complexity of the 
media landscape. Its heads – Komil Allamjanov and 
presidential daughter Saida Mirziyoyeva – previously 
led the AIMK. Unlike the AIMK, which has status of 
a state regulator, the Public Fund is registered as an 
NGO and is supposed to promote the development 
of the media sector through concrete projects funded 
by private donors and grants; for example training for 
journalists and bloggers is planned. It would appear 
that the Public Fund is supposed to become a kind 
of umbrella organisation for the media sector, taking 
up the interests of media-makers, mediating between 
them and the authorities, initiating projects, and 
channelling funding to media sector partners judged 
 
116 Edward Lemon, Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan: Democratization 
or Authoritarian Upgrading? Central Asia Papers (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 12 June 2019), https://www. 
fpri.org/article/2019/06/mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan-democrati 
zation-or-authoritarian-upgrading/ (accessed 11 July 2020); 
see also (in relation to Kazakhstan) Sebastian Schiek, Kasach-
stans autoritäre Partizipationspolitik, SWP-Studie 20/2019 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019). 
117 “Verchovenstvo Konstitucii i zakonov – vazhneyshiy 
kriteriy pravovogo demokraticheskogo gosudarstva i grazh-
danskogo obshchestva” [Rule of constitution and law – the 
most important criterion for a democratic and civil society). 
Address by President Mirziyoyev for Constitution Day of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan, 7 December 2019, https://president. 
uz/ru/lists/view/3119 (accessed 11 July 2020). 
118 “Uzbek Bill Obliges Bloggers to Erase ‘Illegal’ User 
Comments”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 2 October 2019. 
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to be suitable.119 In that respect it is analogous to the 
Yuksalish Movement, which represents the NGO sector 
and (at least potentially and in certain areas) also ab-
sorbs it. While Yuksalish watches over the NGO scene’s 
conformity with the objectives of the reforms, the 
Public Fund has the potential to channel press free-
dom in directions the regime regards as desirable and 
acceptable. 
These forms of containment are apparently regarded 
as inadequate in some quarters. In April 2020 the In-
terior Ministry published a draft resolution – osten-
sibly concerning prevention of youth criminality – 
recommending the establishment of a “virtual group 
of patriotic bloggers” to identify “negative views” in 
social media and create an “atmosphere of intoler-
ance” towards them.120 It remains to be seen whether 
this will be put into practice. Uzbekistan now has 
many active bloggers, who welcome Mirziyoyev’s 
policy of opening, follow political events both critically 
and constructively, and quickly publicise such manipu-
lation attempts.121 They embody precisely the type of 
engaged, socially and medially active citizen that the 
reform policy seeks to foster. Their legitimacy in a 
young and internationally orientated public sphere 
will depend not least on their ability to withstand 
authoritarian and paternalistic cooptation by hard-
liners in security-relevant ministries. 
 
119 “New Uzbek Media NGO Vows to Put Free Speech into 
Practice”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 10 February 2020; see 
also “Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva to Head Uzbek Media 
Fund’s Board of Trustees”, Fergana, 2 February 2020, https:// 
en.fergana.news/news/114721/. 
120 Resolution 16692 is available at https://regulation.gov. 
uz/uz/document/16692 (accessed 11 July 2020). 
121 In this case the blogger Khushnud Khudoyberdiyev 
on 13 April 2020 on Telegram, https://t.me/s/xushnudbek 
(accessed 11 July 2020). Khudoyberdiyev was coopted into 
the state structures in July 2020, when he was appointed 
deputy director of the National News Agency UzA. 
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Foreign policy is not a reform priority in its own right, 
but falls – along with security, nationality policy and 
religion – under Area V of the development strategy. 
And here the parameters developed under Karimov 
remain in force: the commitment to the principle of 
neutrality and a policy often referred to in the post-
Soviet space as multivectoral, in the sense of seeking 
a strategic balance that secures maxium leeway and 
permits a broad spectrum of partnerships.122 But 
there is one decisive difference. Whereas Karimov’s 
priority was preserving independence, especially vis-
à-vis Russia, and his foreign policy was therefore fun-
damentally defensive, the commitment to neutrality 
today is underpinned by an offensive interest in 
regional influence and international empowerment. 
Economic interests are key. Economic moderni-
sation depends centrally on a dynamisation of trade 
relationships and the acquisition of investment 
capital, with foreign policy initiatives recognisably 
orientated on those objectives. The regional neigh-
bourhood tops the new foreign policy agenda,123 as 
the region where Uzbek exports can be most easily 
expanded. Cooperation with Central Asian neigh-
bours, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which 
had in the past suffered from tensions, have improved 
noticeably under Mirziyoyev. Agreement has been 
reached over numerous border demarcation and 
water management issues, which are crucial to rela-
tions with those two states. The reopening of border 
crossings and the establishment of scheduled flights 
(with Tajikistan) now opens the way for an expansion 
 
122 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan, Foreign Policy, https://mfa.uz/en/cooperation/. On the his-
torical context see Aleksey Asiryan, “New Faces, Old Patterns 
in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy”, The Diplomat, 21 August 2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/new-faces-old-patterns-in-
uzbekistans-foreign-policy/ (both accessed 11 July 2020). 
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy (see note 122). 
of economic and trade relations, which represents 
the heart of Uzbekistan’s regional initiatives.124 
These increasingly also include Afghanistan, where 
Uzbekistan played a mediating role in the talks be-
tween the Kabul government and the Taliban and in-
tends to participate in the country’s economic recon-
struction. Uzbek participation in the construction 
of highways, rail links and electricity transmission, 
which had already begun under Karimov, is to be con-
tinued and expanded. Afghanistan is an important 
market for Uzbek exports, especially foodstuffs, phar-
maceuticals, construction materials, mineral fertiliser, 
agricultural machinery and electricity. Both countries 
are also crucial transit corridors for each other.125 
Relations with the region’s major powers Russia 
and China have also intensified enormously. Russia re-
mains the most important strategic partner, as mani-
fested most visibly in the economic sphere. Cooper-
ation in the fuel and energy sectors formed the heart 
of Soviet-era economic cooperation and remains cen-
tral.126 During Vladimir Putin’s state visit in October 
 
124 Umida Hashimova, A Year in Review: Uzbekistan Pursues 
Liberalization at Home, Neighborly Relations Abroad, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, vol. 15, no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foun-
dation, 17 January 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/ 
year-review-uzbekistan-pursues-liberalization-home-
neighborly-relations-abroad/. Central Asia’s share of Uzbek 
foreign trade grew from 8.6 percent in 2015 to almost 16 
percent in 2019: International Monetary Fund, Direction of 
Trade Statistics, http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-
A2F2-59B2CD424B85 (both accessed 14 July 2020). 
125 “Uzbekistan Pursues Economic Partnership with Afgha-
nistan”, Caspian Policy Center, 27 August 2019, https://www. 
caspianpolicy.org/uzbekistan-pursues-economic-partnership-
with-afghanistan/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 
126 Umida Hashimova, In Uzbekistan, Western Powers Compete 
for Influence with Russia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 16, no. 35 
(Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 13 March 2019), 
https://jamestown.org/program/in-uzbekistan-western-powers-
compete-for-influence-with-russia/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 
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2018 contracts were signed for economic projects 
worth US$27 billion, including an agreement to build 
a nuclear power station. Intended to address Uzbeki-
stan’s growing energy needs, the move raised eye-
brows as the first civil nuclear power project in Cen-
tral Asia. Construction is projected to cost about US$10 
billion with completion due in 2030.127 Although 
China (with 20 percent) was just ahead of Russia 
(with 18 percent) on trade in 2018, Russia retains its 
special status, not least as the main destination for 
most Uzbek labour migrants.128 
 
127 “Uzbekistan, Russia Agree on Site for Nuclear Plant”, 
Eurasianet, 2 May 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-
russia-agree-on-site-for-nuclear-plant (accessed 11 July 2020). 
128 “Ezhegodno v Rossiyu vyezzhaet svyshe 2 mln migran-
tov iz Uzbekistana” [Every year more than 2 million migrants 
travel from Uzbekistan to Russia], Podrobno, 18 June 2019, 
https://podrobno.uz/cat/uzbekistan-i-rossiya-dialog-partnerov-/ 
ezhegodno-v-rossiyu-vyezzhaet-svyshe-2-mln-migrantov-i/ 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
Military and security cooperation also resumed in 
2017, with Uzbekistan and Russia conducting joint 
military exercises for the first time since 2005.129 A 
string of defence agreements were also signed, includ-
ing purchases of Russian military equipment.130 This in-
tensification of relations has given rise to speculation 
that Uzbekistan might rejoin the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated mili-
 
129 John C. K. Daly, Russia and Uzbekistan Hold First Joint 
Military Exercise in 12 Years, Plan Further Cooperation, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, vol. 14, no. 122 (Washington, D.C.: Jame-
stown Foundation, 3 October 2017), https://jamestown.org/ 
program/russia-and-uzbekistan-hold-first-joint-military-
exercise-in-12-years-plan-further-cooperation/ (accessed 
11 July 2020). 
130 Ilja Kramnik, “Oruzhie dlya Tashkenta: zachem Rossii 
VTS s Uzbekistanom” [Arms for Tashkent: Why is Russio co-
operating with Uzbekistan on military technology?], Izvestiya, 
17 July 2019, https://iz.ru/899665/ilia-kramnik/oruzhie-dlia-tash 
kenta-zachem-rossii-vts-s-uzbekistanom (accessed 11 July 2020). 
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tary alliance including Belarus as well as Uzbekistan’s 
Central Asian neighbours. Tashkent left the CSTO in 
2012 in the course of a foreign policy realignment. 
The question of an Uzbek accession to the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) is also in the air. Founded in 
2015 and benefitting above all Russia as the strongest 
member economy, the EEU is one of a multitude 
of integration projects in the territory of the former 
Soviet Union that enable Russia to preserve its politi-
cal influence in the region. The question of Uzbek 
membership is contested within the country.131 In 
light of the geopolitical dimension of the EEU, acces-
sion would undoubtedly represent a major foreign 
policy move whose consequences for the success of 
the reform project are hard to foresee. That is prob-
ably why Mirziyoyev has to date avoided taking a 
firm stance on the issue. 
Foreign policy backing the image of a 
reforming state. 
Uzbekistan wishes to keep all options open for 
acquiring the investment it will require to modernise 
and develop its economy. This makes China – which 
has significantly expanded its relations with Central 
Asian states under the conceptual umbrella of the 
“New Silk Road” (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) – a stra-
tegic partner of the first order. China regards Uzbeki-
stan as a key partner for the success of the BRI’s Cen-
tral Asian component,132 and has become Uzbekistan’s 
largest trading partner and an increasingly important 
lender and investor. Most incoming foreign direct in-
vestment since 2016 has originated from China; at the 
end of 2019 about 1,600 Chinese firms were registered 
in Uzbekistan. In January 2020 China opened an eco-
nomic cooperation office in Tashkent. It is located 
within the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade 
and is the first of its kind in Central Asia.133 
 
131 Farkhod Tolipov, “History Repeats Itself: Uzbekistan’s 
New Eurasian Gamble”, CACI Analyst, 22 November 2019, 
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/ 
item/13596-history-repeats-itself-uzbekistans-new-eurasian-
gamble.html (accessed 11 July 2020). 
132 Jeffrey Reeves, “China’s Silk Road Economic Belt Ini-
tiative: Network and Influence Formation in Central Asia”, 
Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 112 (2018): 502–18 
(514). 
133 Yau Tsz Yan, “Chinese Business Briefing: Yuan Wel-
come, But Flights Cancelled”, Eurasianet, 4 February 2020, 
https://eurasianet.org/chinese-business-briefing-yuan-
welcome-but-flights-cancelled (accessed 16 July 2020). 
Chinese capital is flowing into a broad spectrum of 
projects, including conventional and renewable elec-
tricity, petrochemicals, construction and textiles, and 
investment in digital infrastructure and telecommu-
nications rolled out very rapidly. In August 2019 
Uzbekistan’s state telecommunications provider UMS 
signed a credit agreement with the Chinese company 
Huawei for US$150 million to upgrade the Uzbek 
mobile phone network. In April the Uzbek Ministry 
for Development of Information Technologies and 
Communications had already concluded a deal worth 
billions with a subsidiary of the CITIC Group to develop 
digital infrastructure for government agencies and to 
establish a digital “Safe City”134 surveillance structure. The 
equipment for the project, which had been on the 
table since August 2017,135 will also be supplied by 
Huawei.136 
The third pillar of economic progress for Tashkent 
is support from the international financial institutions 
and Western investors. Soft loans from institutions 
like the World Bank are obviously attractive, and the 
World Bank has significantly expanded its engage-
ment since 2016 and supports the Uzbek transforma-
tion project with several billion dollars in loans and 
development aid.137 Western technologies and know-
how have always been prized in Uzbekistan, while 
cooperation with the West functions as a strategic 
counterweight to the structural dominance of the two 
regional powers – and is indispensable for the inter-
national recognition as a relevant actor that Uzbeki-
stan seeks. The commitment to economic and politi-
cal opening laid out in the Development Strategy 
seems to have made the political and ideological dif-
ferences that formerly hampered cooperation a thing 
of the past. 
 
134 “What Is Huawei Safe City Network Solution”, 2 May 
2018, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= gCjNL_2DPYA 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
135 Presidential resolution PP-3245 of 29 August 2017 is ac-
cessible at https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3324011 (accessed 11 July 2020). 
136 Umida Hashimova, Uzbekistan Increasingly Turns to China 
for Development Loans, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 16, no. 118 
(4 September 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/uzbeki 
stan-increasingly-turns-to-china-for-development-loans/ 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
137 In April 2020 World Bank loans and credits to Uzbeki-
stan totalled US$4.14 billion, half of which was development 
assistance: World Bank, The World Bank in Uzbekistan: Country 
Snapshot, Stand 1 April 2020, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/ 
en/988861587043457680/Uzbekistan-Snapshot-Apr2020.pdf 
(accessed 11 July 2020). 
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The commitment to liberal values plays a promi-
nent role in the way Uzbekistan presents itself to 
Western partners. The strategy document itself and 
the terms it uses are to quite some extent a response 
to the expectations of international donors, which 
tie their support to promises of good governance. The 
core components of the concept, which was developed 
in the 1990s by the World Bank,138 include protecting 
property rights, transparency in public administra-
tion, and accountability of the executive for use of 
public resources; those objectives also feature promi-
nently in Uzbekistan’s development agenda. The 
rankings of the World Bank, which supports and 
advises Uzbekistan on the implementation of re-
forms,139 therefore represent – like the rankings 
and indices of other relevant institutions and organi-
sations – an important frame of reference for the 
success of Mirziyoyev’s policies. 
In January 2019, in connection with the determi-
nation of reform priorities for the year (“investment 
and social development”) the government decided 
to establish a department for international rankings 
within the presidential administration and to name 
individuals within ministries and agencies who are 
responsible for positioning Uzbekistan. The rankings 
are listed in the decree and include all the relevant 
sources: from the World Bank’s Doing Business Index 
and the OECD’s country risk classifications to Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and 
the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom 
Index. The aforementioned AIMK is expected to func-
tion as a “PR centre responsible for organising broad 
information and propaganda especially in business 
circles”.140 
 
138 Andrea Schmitz, “Entwicklungspolitische Konditio-
nalität und Demokratisierung”, in Externe Faktoren der Demo-
kratisierung, ed. Gero Erdmann and Marianne Kneuer (Baden-
Baden, 2009), 127–45 (131 f.). 
139 The World Bank in Uzbekistan: Country Snapshot (April 
2020), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/988861587043457 
680/Uzbekistan-Snapshot-Apr2020.pdf (accessed 15 July 
2020). 
140 Presidential Decree UP-5635 of 17 January 2019 is 
accessible at https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4168757. A follow-up-
decree of 7 March 2019 (UP-5687, https://lex.uz/docs/4230910) 
appointed a commission to coordinate the “work with inter-
national rankings and indices” and gave the Finance Minis-
try more staff to deal with the issue. Another decree, of 2 
June 2020 (UP-6003, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4838765 [all ac-
cessed 11 July 2020]) established a national advisory group in 
There is plainly awareness that willingness to 
invest in Uzbekistan presupposes confidence in the 
sustainability of the reforms, and that the problematic 
aspects of Uzbek politics – such as nepotistic tenden-
cies in appointments and a lack of judicial independ-
ence – have certainly not gone unnoticed in the 
West.141 Creating a “positive international image” is 
consequently a pressing task of Uzbek foreign policy, 
with the authorities sparing neither cost nor effort 
to present Uzbekistan as a free and competition-orien-
tated country with a “centuries-old culture of toler-
ance and hospitality” that is attractive to investors 
and tourists alike.142 Stemming forced labour, releas-
ing political prisoners and closing a high-security 
prison that had become a symbol of Karimov’s tyranny 
have also won recognition.143 
The reward for these efforts can be seen in Uzbeki-
stan’s rising position in the relevant rankings, in a 
growing willingness to invest and in the development 
of tourism.144 Within the country these changes are 
presented as confirmation of the success of President 
Mirziyoyev’s reform course. This improves the chances 
of consolidating his policy of controlled opening, 
which is supposed to bring about a better life for 
Uzbeks and international recognition of their state. 
 
response to ongoing dissatisfaction over the country’s posi-
tion in international rankings. In order to motivate officials 
to engage more on the issue, Uzbekistan’s position in im-
portant rankings is to be included in their performance 
evaluations. 
141 Todd Prince, “Where Wall Street Meets Tashkent: Amid 
Reforms at Home, Uzbek Officials Make Their Pitch to Inves-
tors in New York”, RFE/RL, 24 July 2019, https://www.rferl. 
org/a/uzbekistan-wall-street-investors-reforms/30073584. 
html?ltflags=mailer (accessed 11 July 2020). 
142 “Official Says Uzbekistan Deserves Better International 
Image”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 29 July 2019; see also 
“Senator Hailed for Uzbekistan’s Enhanced International 
Standing”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 25 June 2019. 
143 Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan: Events of 2019, https:// 
www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/uzbekistan 
(accessed 15 July 2020). 
144 Between 2017 and 2018 – within the space of a year – 
foreign direct investment in Uzbekistan quadrupled from 
$98 million to $412 million: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2019, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_ 
en.pdf. During the same period the number of tourists 
visiting Uzbekistan grew by about 2.5 million: World Data, 
Tourism in Uzbekistan, https://www.worlddata.info/asia/ 
uzbekistan/tourism.php (both accessed 11 July 2020). 
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Uzbekistan on Course for Reforms 
The reform process is fully under way, seeking to 
modernise and liberalise the economy and society. 
The strategy paper with which President Mirziyoyev 
came to power guides the process of reinventing 
Uzbekistan and has initiated a wealth of activities 
in all spheres of state and society. The dismantling 
of barriers to trade, investment and private enterprise 
is – in conjunction with a comprehensive lifting of 
visa requirements – dynamising the economy and 
creating visible change. The will to renewal is reflected 
in extensive construction activity and radical redevel-
opment of cities and landscapes, while the digitalisa-
tion of public infrastructure is in the process of revo-
lutionising modes and means of communication. 
Internally too the reform course is paving the way 
for liberalisation, as a shift towards controlled politi-
cal participation and freedom of expression and away 
from repression. The introduction of principles of 
rule of law is having a noticeable influence on the 
domestic political climate – manifested not least 
in an enormous increase in legislative activity and 
reforms requiring state officials to show a stronger 
service orientation and obliging politicians to exhibit 
greater openness and accountability. Public discourse 
is also becoming more diverse to the benefit of Uz-
bekistan’s international reputation and foreign policy 
reach. Both have positive effects on the acquisition 
of investors and international donors for economic 
modernisation projects. 
This politics of opening represents a break with the 
Karimov system, which had forced Uzbekistan into iso-
lation and was hated by many Uzbeks, but supported 
for decades by an elite to which the new leader also 
belonged. The challenge for Mirziyoyev was therefore 
to generate support for (or at least compliance with) 
for his reform course among the relevant actors, to 
either integrate or neutralise potential veto players, and 
thus to create the preconditions for lasting reforms. 
To this end the security apparatus was restructured 
to clearly circumscribe the powers of the individual 
agencies and assure the safety and security of the presi-
dent and his family. Secondly, the president filled key 
posts with trusted confidants from the Karimov era, 
including close relatives. Otherwise young experts, 
many of whom had studied abroad, were recruited for 
leadership positions wherever possible. They identify 
with the goals of the reforms and are highly motivated, 
but are still a minority. The civil service is dominated 
by individuals who were socialised in the Karimov era. 
They lack performance orientation, which is a central 
virtue in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan and which the presi-
dent also expects from civil servants. Efforts are under 
way to remedy this situation as quickly as possible 
through training and active promotion of new talent. 
Thirdly, social changes are supposed to consolidate 
the reform process. The key liberal concepts of open-
ness, dialogue and participation are employed here to 
promote confidence. Unlike earlier times, Uzbeks are 
now encouraged to express their opinions and advo-
cate for their interests, and the reform concept requires 
politicians and officials to heed the needs of the people 
and take them seriously. Conversely the population is 
expected to participate actively in the national reforms. 
In the context of the reform policies the concept of 
participation is less an offer than a demand for citi-
zens to accept the reforms, engage in their implemen-
tation and if necessary put their own needs second. 
The regional and international context is also of 
great importance for the Uzbek reforms. The objec-
tive of modernising the economy cannot be achieved 
without foreign investment. Rapid visible progress 
is needed to secure the reform course and its sustain-
ability. Foreign policy is therefore strongly focussed 
on making Uzbekistan attractive to investors and 
presenting the country as a dependable partner of 
international standing. “There is no way back,” the 
Perspectives and Implications 
for Cooperation 
 The Limits of Transformation 
 SWP Berlin 
 Uzbekistan’s Transformation 
 September 2020 
 29 
Uzbek leadership assures both its domestic public 
and foreign investors145 – to date with success.146 
The Limits of Transformation 
So the die is cast for a new path forward. But what 
this really means for Uzbekistan remains open. The 
selective liberalisation pursued in the reform concept 
could lead to a further opening, one that ultimately 
also encompasses the political institutions and paves 
the way for democratisation. But it could also end in 
an “enlightened authoritarianism” that combines free 
market structures with effective and lawful govern-
ance, enables controlled political participation, but 
prevents real political competition. There is much to 
suggest that the latter option will shape Uzbekistan’s 
future development because strong moments of 
inertia block any shift to an open society governed 
by democratic principles and rule of law. 
This is seen for example in opaque public tender-
ing practices. These are especially obvious in the con-
struction sector, where they are associated with mas-
sive abuses echoing the clientelist appropriation of 
resources that characterised the Karimov era. For 
example construction projects associated with the pro-
motion of tourism are often rushed through approval 
processes and cause irreparable harm to the historic 
heritage. Laws and regulations are also regularly 
ignored and property rights violated in the implemen-
tation of the (World Bank–funded) government pro-
grammes “Prosperous Villages” and “Prosperous Neigh-
bourhoods”, which are designed to boost the private 
sector and have triggered a construction boom in the 
towns and villages. In all cases the violations occurred 
with the consent of the relevant authorities, the 
hokims – if not at their instigation.147 After a series 
 
145 “Es gibt keinen Weg zurück” (interview with the 
Uzbek foreign minister), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2019, 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/usbekistan-reformen-
komilow-1.4307921 (accessed 12 July 2020). 
146 Cyril Muller, “Sharing My Optimism for Uzbekistan’s 
Future” (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 27 February 
2019), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2019/02/ 
27/sharing-my-optimism-for-uzbekistans-future (accessed 
12 July 2020). 
147 Aziz Jakubov, “Samarkand for sale: Kto kontroliruet 
zastroyku osnovnogo turisticheskogo centra Uzbekistana” 
[Samarkand for sale: Who controls the expansion of an 
important Uzbek tourism centre?], Fergana, 15 December 
2018, https://fergana.agency/articles/103286/; Early Warning 
of such cases were publicly reported President Mirzi-
yoyev distanced himself explicitly from the hokims, 
but left them in office.148 
There is plainly no intention of disrupting the 
institutional framework that enables abuse of power 
by the local elites. Although the new legislation pro-
vides for the hokims to be elected by the local parlia-
ments, this follows “consultations” with the president 
who will thus exercise direct influence over appoint-
ments. In the absence of effective checks and balances 
it is still the president who decides. 
The persistence of the old order is clearly discern-
ible in the parliament and political parties. The parlia-
mentary elections of December 2019 provide a good 
example. Although the campaign was a great deal 
more lively than in earlier elections, with broader 
public participation, it still left little room for real 
political competition.149 And the only parties per-
mitted to participate were those founded under Kari-
mov to grant an appearance of plurality to the politi-
cal system. None of them fought on a regime-critical 
platform, and their programmes differ only marginally. 
Unsurprisingly, the election results provided no sur-
prises. Each of the five parties received about the 
same number of seats as in 2014, leaving the compo-
sition of parliament practically unaltered. On the 
other hand, more than half of the deputies are new 
and the parliament as a whole is younger and more 
female.150 
 
System, Uzbekistan Prosperous Villages, https://ewsdata.rights 
indevelopment.org/projects/p168233-uzbekistan-prosperous-
villages-obod-qishloq/. See also “Za poslednie dva goda pro-
kuratura vyyavila chishcheniya v stroitel’stve na 38 milliar-
dov sumov. Zavedeno 365 ugolovnych del” [In just two years 
state prosecutor uncovers theft of 38 billion som. 365 cases 
opened], Pordobno, 7 May 2020, https://podrobno.uz/cat/ 
obchestvo/za-poslednie-dva-goda-prokuratura-vyyavila-
khishcheniya-v-stroitelstve-na-38-milliardov-sumov-zavede/ 
(all accessed 12 July 2020). 
148 “Uzbek Leader Attacks Governors over Illegal Demoli-
tions”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 5 August 2019; “Three Uz-
bek Governors Given Chance to Regain People’s Trust”, BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia, 9 August 2019. 
149 OSCE/ODHIR, Republic of Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elec-
tions 22 December 2019, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
Final Report (Warsaw, 13 May 2020). 
150 Bruce Pannier, “Will Fresh Faces, More Women In New 
Uzbek Parliament Make a Difference?” RFE/RL, 13 January 
2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/will-fresh-faces-more-women-in-
new-uzbek-parliament-make-a-difference-/30374382.html? 
ltflags=mailer (accessed 12 July 2020). 
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It is questionable, however, whether this will 
dynamise the work of parliament. Despite the recent 
reforms to expand its powers (see above, p. 12) par-
liament still plays only a subsidiary role in political 
decision-making and functions above all as an im-
plementing organ for the plans of the executive. 
Although the president consistently calls on parlia-
ment to act as the “initiator of reforms”, driving im-
plementation through legislative initiatives,151 this 
always means within the framework of the reform 
agenda, whose basic tenets are not up for discussion. 
Functioning in a sense as an arm of the executive, the 
actual role of parliamentarians is to act on instruc-
tions from the president, as the supreme represen-
tative of the new state doctrine. 
The legacy of the past is manifested not least in 
the way criticism and dissent are handled. Although 
citizens are encouraged to express their opinions and 
participate, and the media landscape has been visibly 
liberalised, the expectation is that civil engagement 
will adhere to the reform script as interpreted by the 
official organs. To back up this process, the latter have 
initiated the founding of “NGOs” whose role is to en-
sure that freedom of expression is used as intended 
and civil society engagement remains within bounds.152 
The limits of the new civil liberties rapidly become 
apparent where criticism takes an unexpected – 
usually meaning undesirable – turn. In such cases 
it also becomes obvious that the entrenched mecha-
nisms of repression are still effective. Torture, namely, 
remains an everyday occurrence in Uzbek prisons.153 
 
151 “Poslanie Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan Shavkata 
Mirzieeva Oliy Mazhlisu” [Address to parliament by the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev], 
22 December 2017, https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/1371. 
Similar: “Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan 
Shavkat Mirzieeva na pervom zasedanii zakonodatel’noy 
palaty Oliy Mazhlisa” [Speech by the President of the Repub-
lic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the first session of 
the legislative chamber of parliament], 20 January 2020, 
https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/3303 (both accessed 12 July 
2020). 
152 See above, p. 13 (DSC), p. 20 f. (NGO Yuksalish) and 
p. 22 f. (Public Fund for Support and Development of National 
Mass Media). 
153 “Uzbekistan: Blogger Flees Country, Cites Pressure 
from Authorities”, Eurasianet, 21 January 2020, https:// 
eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-blogger-flees-country-cites-
pressure-from-authorities. On the prisons: Aziz Jakubov, 
“Etapom v Navoiy – zla nemereno” [Prisoner in Navoiy – 
a centre of evil], Fergana, 27 November 2019, https://fergana. 
A new authoritarian social contract? 
While the official reform discourse foregrounds 
liberal ideas of governance, the principles of the 
authoritarian social contract continue to guide 
actions. These include rigid vertical chains of com-
mand that reward obedience and permit initiative 
from below only where it is aligned with official 
directives. The top of these chains of command is 
always the president, to whom the constitution still 
grants sweeping powers. He decrees the direction of 
policy and guards the reputation of the polity, as its 
supreme representative. The image of a reforming 
state, personified in the president, is the yardstick 
of the politically correct and morally desirable.154 
This orientation on image explains why institutional 
actors regularly resort to practices incompatible with 
the official reform programme. In April 2020 it was 
reported that school staff had been instructed to send 
mass text messages praising the state’s crisis manage-
ment in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic and 
thanking the president personally. Parents of school 
students were also instrumentalised to disseminate 
propaganda messages.155 
Other measures responding to the COVID-19 pan-
demic also suggest that Karimov’s legacy weighs heavier 
than the reform discourse and its external reception 
would suggest. For example economic planning in-
struments that were being phased out have been re-
instated to address the economic losses associated 
with measures taken to contain the pandemic. These 
include production quotas for particular agricultural 
crops. Information control techniques associated with 
the authoritarian era have also been reactivated 
during the crisis.156 
 
agency/articles/112807/?country=uz (both accessed 12 July 
2020). 
154 Very obviously for example in his invective against 
the hokims in August 2019: “Zo’ravonlik foyda bo’lganida 
30 yilda zo’r bo’lib kettan bo’lar edik” [If violence helped 
we would have grown strong in the past 30 years], Youtube, 
2 August 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D947 
EgE5u5o (accessed 12 July 2020). 
155 “Tashkentskich uchiteley ispol’zuyut v kachestve 
‘trolley’, voshvaljajushchich karantinnuyu politiku Mirzi-
yaeva” [Tashkent teachers used as ‘trolls’ to praise Mirziyo-
yev’s quarantine policy], RFE/RL, 27 April 2020, https://rus. 
ozodlik.org/a/30577701.html?withmediaplayer=1 (with 
numerous examples, accessed 12 July 2020). 
156 Janis Kluge, Andrea Schmitz, Franziska Smolnik and 
Susan Stewart, Eurasiens Wirtschaft und Covid-19, SWP-Aktuell 
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Because the tried and tested options tend to be 
those from the past, actors that are sceptical towards 
the new course or reject it outright might be in a 
position to gain in influence. In the first place this 
means the representatives of the old regime in the 
ministries and the economic losers of the reforms. 
The latter include those expropriated without ad-
equate compensation for modernisation projects in 
villages and neighbourhoods, and the many labour 
migrants who have returned to Uzbekistan after 
becoming unemployed in the Russian Federation in 
the course of the pandemic. The cost of living has 
risen sharply in recent years, while the labour market 
still offers scant opportunity.157 If this situation leads 
to even sporadic unrest the use of force to secure 
public order cannot be excluded – even in the “new” 
Uzbekistan. The spirit of the authoritarian past is 
still very much alive, especially in law enforcement, 
where brutal coercion techniques are used with the 
approval of superiors.158 
The pace of implementation of the economic 
reforms, the intensity of legislative activity and the 
president’s insistence all obscure the tenacity of the 
old structures. To the Uzbek reformers the latter are 
relics of an era they regard as irrelevant for future 
developments and wish to leave behind as quickly as 
possible. The foreign audience of the Uzbek reforms 
also shares that perspective. But at least in the medium 
term it must be assumed that the simultaneity of dif-
ferent, and sometimes contradictory modes of govern-
ance, rules and practices will determine the direction 
of the Uzbek transformation and will see the mecha-
nisms of the old order snap back into action, espe-
cially in situations of crisis. 
Recommendations 
Many openings are available for German and Euro-
pean cooperation with Uzbekistan, which should 
pursue a fundamental orientation on supporting 
developments towards an open society. Four fields 
are especially relevant. They all relate to Area I of the 
development agenda, which concerns the relationship 
 
47/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 
2020), 3 f. 
157 Ibid., 4. 
158 “Systemic Reforms Urged as Uzbek Man Dies after 
Police Torture”, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 15 June 2020. 
between state and society and thus the heart of the 
authoritarian social contract. 
∎ “Dialogue” with the population. Communication re-
mains heavily shaped by a paternalistic top-down 
approach: the state defines what its citizens should 
wish for. They should engage, but only in the for-
mats provided. They should develop new ideas, but 
only in prescribed areas. They should be critical, 
but steer well clear of sensitive matters. These con-
tradictions need to be raised with Uzbek partners. 
They need to be encouraged to permit real partici-
pation and autonomous civil engagement, to ab-
stain from state cooptation, and to reward criticism 
of abuses rather than merely tolerating it. Oppor-
tunities to support independent voices in Uzbeki-
stan also need to be identified, for example through 
education partnerships and cooperation in the 
media sphere. 
∎ Cooperation with the political parties. The reform agenda 
explicitly calls for an expansion of political com-
petition, as does the president himself. Although 
the scope of competition remains restricted and 
relatively narrow, opportunities certainly arise, for 
example in terms of sharpening the parties’ politi-
cal programmes and their relevance to voters’ in-
terests. Here there is scope for political foundations 
to become involved. The next parliamentary elec-
tions, scheduled for late 2024 or early 2025, create 
a potential timeline for such cooperation. They will 
also reveal how much political competition the 
Uzbek reforms can tolerate. 
∎ Parliamentary cooperation. Here there are two pri-
mary interests: Firstly to strengthen the legislative 
competence of parliamentarians, to stimulate criti-
cal debate on draft legislation and to ensure its 
relevance to the interests of the voters, as articulated 
in the relevant online portals. Secondly to support 
parliamentary control and oversight over the execu-
tive, which the president himself mentioned in 
his January 2020 address to the new Oliy Majlis,159 
through targeted cooperation with parliamentary 
committees. Assistance from the research service of 
the German Bundestag would also be conceivable. 
Whatever form it takes, cooperation should aim to 
strengthen the independence of the parliament vis-
à-vis the government and the president and foster 
its development into a venue of genuine debate 
about political alternatives. 
 
159 “Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan” 
(see note 151). 
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∎ Inclusion of the local level. There are growing calls to 
change the procedures for electing provincial gov-
ernors, to have them elected directly. The president 
himself had already called for such a change in 
2016,160 in order to curtail the power of local lead-
ers and to make them more accountable to the 
public. The measures introduced thus far are plainly 
inadequate. Passing the new Law on Local Govern-
ments, which gives local parliaments the power 
to remove hokims would also be an important 
step forward. Ways should be sought to boost the 
role of local parliaments and civil society vis-à-vis 
the powerful hokims. That would certainly serve 
the principles of good governance and respect for 
the law that feature so prominently in Uzbeki-
stan’s reform agenda. 
 
160 “Chokimiyaty i vlast’” (see note 92). 
Abbreviations 
AIMK Agenstvo Informacii i Massovych Kommuni-
kacij (Agency for Information and Mass Com-
munication) 
ARGOS Agenstvo Razvitija Gosudarstvennoj Sluzhby 
(Agency for Civil Service Development) 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
CACI Central Asia – Caucasus Institute 
(Washington, D.C., The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies) 
CITIC Group China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation 
CNN Cable News Network 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization  
DSC Development Strategy Centre 
EEU Eurasian Economic Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations 
GoNGO Government organised NGO 
GSBP Gosudarstvennaja Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Prezi-
denta (State Security Service of the President) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OSCE/ODIHR Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights 
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
SGB Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti 
(State Security Service ) 
SNB Sluzhba Nacional’noj Bezopasnosti 
(National Security Service) 
SSR Soviet Socialist Republic 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment 
USAID United States Agency for International Develop-
ment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
